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State Responsibility for The Exportation Of Nuclear Power Technology, 
by Anthony D'Amato* and Kirsten Engel**, 74 Va. L. Rev. 1011-1066, 1988 
 
Abstract:  Should nations that export nuclear power plants to developing countries be potentially liable to the peo-
ple of those countries for catastrophic accidents?  Risk of accident can be reduced if international law compels up-
grading of safety design and construction of nuclear plants.  Both the international law of state responsibility and an 
international regulatory agency have roles to play. 
 
Tags: Nuclear accidents, State responsibility, Territorial principle, Denial of justice, Philippine power plant at 
Napot Point 
[pg1011]*** I. INTRODUCTION 
 Should nations that export nuclear power plants to developing countries be potentially li-
able to the people of those countries for catastrophic accidents such as meltdowns of the plants 
themselves, substantial radiation leaks in the atmosphere, or irradiation of water and soil that 
could render uninhabitable or useless large areas of the receiving nation?FN1 At first glance, the 
fact that exporter and importer [pg1012] are sovereign nations—coupled with the underdevel-
oped state of international law in this field—suggests legal immunity for both. The failure of ex-
porting nations even to consider relevant the question of the health and well-being of the popula-
tion of the importer demonstrates the psychological distance between present attitudes and inter-
national imposition of liability. The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) con-
sistently refuses to "evaluate the health and safety characteristics of the facilities to be ex-
ported."FN2 Yet psychological distances have a way of being rapidly compressed in the unfortu-
nate event of a great public calamity. The goal of this Article is to shorten that psychological dis-
tance—in advance of public necessity and in the hope of helping to avert catastrophic accidents. 
The risk of accident can be reduced if international law compels an upgrading of safety design 
and construction of nuclear plants. We suggest that international environmental responsibility of 
the exporting nation is neither far-fetched nor unlikely. 
 That the exporting nation (which we will call nation "E") may have liability under inter-
national law to the population of the receiving nation (nation "R") is a thesis that has been under-
appreciated in the burgeoning literature devoted to nuclear power safety.FN3 Most [pg1013] 
writers considering the topic of liability for nuclear plant accidents or emissions primarily ad-
dress transboundary physical and environmental harm.FN4 Yet the most likely victims of nu-
clear disasters—the people of the nation in which the nuclear plant is located—have largely been 
overlooked. To be sure, many scholars would say that those people have no international claims 
and can only look to their own government for possible help.FN5 In this Article, we take a con-
trary position. 
  [pg1014] There are good reasons for considering the export of nuclear power plants as a 
category separate and distinct from the general category of the export of hazardous materials or 
unsafe products. First, the hazards of radiation leakage and catastrophic emissions from melt-
downs seem to present a unique peril. Sudden and unseen danger to human health is of a differ-
ent order of magnitude than other hazardous activities. Indeed, as this Article was in the research 
stage, the most serious nuclear meltdown in history, exceeding the partial meltdown at Three 
Mile Island in the United States, occurred near Kiev at the Soviet Union's Chernobyl nuclear 
power plant.FN6 Yet the magnitude of the health hazard posed by nuclear power plants is gener-
ally downplayed. Whereas the recent chemical plant catastrophe in Bhopal, India involving non-
nuclear technology caused over 2,000 deaths,FN7 the plant was only one of two constructed by 
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Union Carbide [pg1015] in the entire world. Nuclear power plants, with a potential of far greater 
harm, have now been exported to nine developing nations. As of December 31, 1986, a total of 
38 were in operation, 32 were under construction, and 39 were planned.FN8 
 Second, nuclear power plant importation is characteristically and invariably a public 
function of government. The transfer of nuclear technology is quintessentially a government-to-
government decision,FN9 even though private manufacturers of the technology may be involved. 
The importing state is actively involved and its entire population is affected. In this respect, ex-
port of nuclear technology is altogether different from the export of consumer products. More-
over, electric-power generation from nuclear plants is typically a public utility having monopoly 
or quasi-monopoly status. Finally, as the Chernobyl accident demonstrated, a nuclear meltdown 
can contaminate [pg1016] the global commons, lending nuclear power exportation a significant, 
if not unique, international safety dimension. This can be distinguished from the general case of 
exportation of hazardous materials or unsafe products whose harmful effects rarely extend be-
yond the borders of the receiving nation. 
 Certainly, some of the issues we will address will overlap with similar issues that relate to 
the exportation of hazardous materials or unsafe products in general. Yet because certain risks 
are unique to nuclear power,FN10 and because of the separate category that the nuclear power 
industry holds in the mind of the public, it is appropriate to deal with our topic in relative isola-
tion from the export of hazardous products or technologies in general. Most writers who deal 
with the problem of transboundary nuclear pollution similarly focus primarily on the analysis of 
nuclear power. 
 There is also reason to single out the export of nuclear plants to developing nations in 
particular. The transfer to and use of hazardous technology by developing states raises distinct 
problems, including lack of sufficient information concerning the hazards of technologies, lack 
of sufficient expertise to monitor ongoing performance, and lack of experienced regulatory and 
administrative bodies.FN11 Although these insufficiencies are not the source of the exporters' 
liability proposed in this essay, they do serve to demonstrate that the exporter-importer relation-
ship regarding a technology as advanced as that of nuclear power is not the normal everyday 
trade relationship between nations. Hence, it deserves careful, and, to some extent, autonomous 
consideration. 
 Our topic gains current importance largely because importing governments in developing 
nations have failed to develop domestic regulatory organizations to cope with the unreviewed 
safety aspects of nuclear imports. It may be that developing nations value the benefits of nuclear 
power over its potential social and economic costs, or that due to the competition among export-
ers to sell nuclear technology, importing nations have not been subject to external pressures to 
include needed safety features. They have also failed to obtain safety [pg1017] guarantees in pri-
vate contracts with nuclear power manufacturers.FN12 It is, of course, the exporting nations that 
have the expertise and domestic experience needed to require safety features in the design and 
construction of nuclear power plants. Because of economic reluctance to add safety features that 
might raise costs and thus lose bids, however, regulation and assessment by most nuclear export-
ers have become mere formalities.FN13 In addition to the lack of economic incentive, these na-
tions typically argue that such insistence would threaten to impinge upon the sovereignty of the 
receiving nation, an argument in which the receiving nation often concurs.FN14 
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  [pg1018] In this Article we will argue that exporting states bear a minimal responsibility 
for the safety of the population of developing countries from accidents caused by the nuclear 
technology exported to these countries by private entities within the exporting states. Such a re-
sponsibility exists, we contend, even if the governments of the importing nations demonstrate a 
lack of concern for their population's safety in the name of "sovereignty," and even if they grant 
a waiver of responsibility to the exporting nation. This claim of state responsibility is a logical 
extension of the developing international law of human rights—a law that trumps the legal power 
of the exporter and the importer to jointly shield themselves from liability to individuals even if 
they execute intergovernmental waivers of liability. 
 We begin in Part II with a discussion of the United States' involvement in the export of 
the previously mentioned Westinghouse nuclear power plant to the Philippines in 1977-78.FN15 
As we shall see, the various international legal issues that could have been raised in that case 
were almost completely overlooked.FN16 We will then focus, in Part III, upon two prominent 
doctrines of public international law as animating sources for the discovery and articulation of 
the exporting nation's international legal responsibilities toward the people of the importing na-
tion. These twin pillars of the classic law of state responsibility for injuries to aliens are the doc-
trine of the international minimum standard and the standard of nondiscrimination against nonna-
tionals.FN17 Traditionally, these doctrines imposed duties upon a state only for injuries to aliens 
incurred within the state's own boundaries. We shall argue, however, that this boundary limita-
tion does not implicate the essence of the doctrines.FN18 Indeed, newly emerging concepts of 
international justice among states arguably dissolve territorial line-drawing in appropriate cases.  
FN19 We will argue that the principles of state responsibility become relevant to emerging con-
cepts of justice in the export of nuclear power plants—that state E should not discriminate 
against aliens and the degree of safety delivered to aliens should not [pg1019] fall below an in-
ternationally recognized minimum standard. FN20 Following our discussion of the applicability 
of the law of state responsibility to nuclear power exportation, we will discuss in Part IV the ob-
ligations imposed upon nation E through that application. We will suggest that the nondiscrimi-
nation principle places upon E a duty of full disclosure to R of any safety defects of the exported 
plant as compared to E's domestic nuclear safety regulations or its actual domestic nuclear power 
plants. We will also suggest that the international minimum standard prevents E from exporting 
any nuclear power technology that falls below a certain level of safety, regardless of E's full dis-
closure of the plant's defects or R's consent to receive the plant with those defects.FN21 
 Finally, we conclude our essay in Part V by proposing the establishment of a regime of 
international regulation of nuclear power exportation with standards set above that of the mini-
mum international standard. This would promote the individual and collective self-interests of 
exporting nations by reducing or eliminating the competitive disadvantage that would otherwise 
result from including costly safety features.FN22 Since safety concerns enter into all stages of 
the design and construction of a plant—from the decision of the proper site for the plant to the 
determination of what safety features should be included in its design—the reader should not ex-
pect this essay to propose specific regulatory standards for any and all exportable nuclear power 
plants. Rather, we are proposing minimal norms that nevertheless have significant implications 
for international tort liability and hence for modifying nuclear power export behavior. In any 
event, international law should be looked upon in this context as consisting of general purposive 
standards subject to reasonable elaboration in specific cases. Even general standards, however, 





II. THE FAILURE OF UNILATERAL DOMESTIC EXPORT REGULATION: 
THE PHILIPPINE NUCLEAR POWER CASE 
 Many of the safety issues involved in the exportation of nuclear power to developing na-
tions are found in the 1975 Philippine nuclear [pg1020] power case.FN23 The safety problems 
presented by the nuclear power plant manufactured by Westinghouse, and the collateral legal is-
sues presented by the U.S. decision not to reveal those problems to the Philippine government 
were debated before two forums: the NRC FN24 and the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit.FN25 The case is generalizable for the purposes of this essay in two 
important respects. First, it demonstrates the inherent limitations of domestic licensing schemes 
in the regulation of nuclear export safety. Second, by highlighting the safety concerns raised by 
this typical nuclear power plant's design, construction and operation, the case may be read as 
suggesting key areas susceptible to uniform standards and international regulation. 
 Even before Westinghouse filed for an export license in 1976, the safety of the projected 
Filipino plant was widely criticized in both the Philippines and the U.S. Opposition began in the 
Philippines in 1976 with the work of a young nun who organized members of a Catholic parish 
near the plant's site to study the benefits and risks of the proposed facility.FN26 This local oppo-
sition was wholly ineffectual, however, in persuading the regime of President Ferdinand Marcos 
to reconsider the plant's construction.FN27 In August of that year, however, a force-eight earth-
quake struck the nearby island of Mandanao, killing four thousand people and temporarily halt-
ing all work on the site preparation.FN28 To reassure the Filipino public of the plant's safety, 
President Marcos required top Westinghouse officials to give his government written assurances 
and supporting studies of the plant's safety.FN29 The rigor of the government's review, however, 
was [pg1021] seriously undercut by persistent rumors in the American press of payoffs to Mar-
cos' family members and close confidants to secure the Philippines contract.FN30 These reports, 
later substantiated,FN31 fueled opposition groups in the U.S. which, with their Filipino counter-
parts, called for increased U.S. monitoring and investigation of the Philippines project. 
 The most damaging objection to the Westinghouse plant came from the Union of Con-
cerned Scientists, who called for the denial of an export license to Westinghouse based upon se-
rious technical and logistical flaws in the plant's proposal.FN32 Of primary concern to the Union 
of Concerned Scientists was the siting of the plant—fourteen kilometers from Mt. Natib, a vol-
cano considered active under NRC standards, and approximately twelve miles from the U.S. 
Subic Bay naval base, home to over 12,000 Americans.FN33 As early as 1976, the Philippines 
Atomic Energy Commission had asked the NRC to review the "Preliminary Site Investigation 
Report" prepared by a U.S. consulting firm for the Philippine government.FN34 In this review, 
which was not considered by the NRC in granting the export license, [pg1022] the NRC staff 
found that the volcanic hazards of the site had not been thoroughly addressed and recommended 
further study of offshore earthquake faults.FN35 An evaluation of the volcanic and earthquake 
hazards was in fact undertaken by the independent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
in 1978, but the results were kept secret for almost a year due to political pressure by the Philip-
pine government.FN36 The IAEA found the site was "unique to the nuclear industry insofar as 
the risk associated with nearby volcanoes is concerned."FN37 Besides finding the eruption of 
Mt. Natib a distinct possibility, the IAEA recommended the installment of a volcanic surveil-
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lance system and a determination of the feasibility of removing radioactive materials from the 
site.FN38 
 Equally distressing to U.S. scientists was the plant's design, which, it was discovered, had 
never undergone a detailed, technical review by the NRC, even by proxy.FN39 Other safety con-
cerns focused on the capacity of supplemental safety systems, both technical and human, to miti-
gate the possibility and the effects of a radioactive leak or meltdown.FN40 Furthermore, the Un-
ion of Concerned Scientists expressed doubt over the reliability of the Philippine nuclear safety 
commission after the commission gave inaccurate descriptions of some relatively simple of the 
plant which were intended to protect the reactor against high pressure.FN41 
 Fueled by these concerns, the Philippine Movement for Environmental Protection and the 
U.S.-based Center for Development Policy [pg1023] petitioned the NRC for a hearing on the 
dangers inherent in locating a plant at the proposed Napot Point site and on the safety of Filipi-
nos and Americans residing in the immediate area.FN42 Consistent with earlier decisions, FN43 
a plurality of the NRC Board of Commissioners voted to issue the plant's license.FN44 In so do-
ing, the Board reaffirmed its position that it did not have jurisdiction under domestic statutes to 
consider the health, safety, and environmental impacts on the citizens of a recipient nation,  
FN45 or even to consider the effects of an exported reactor on U.S. interests and U.S. citizens 
abroad.FN46 The Board claimed that the concept of territorial sovereignty supported a limited 
interpretation of the agency's jurisdiction, because the Philippine government had "made it clear" 
that a detailed health and safety review of the proposed export "would be regarded as an intru-
sion into its sovereign responsibilities."FN47 
  [pg1024] The Board also openly expressed its concern that if it undertook a detailed re-
view, the U.S. would be considered ultimately responsible for the safety of the imported reactor, 
even though aspects of its design, construction, and operation were not within the Board's control 
and could not be monitored for safety hazards.FN48 "No matter how thorough the NRC review," 
the plurality stated, "the [Board] would not be in a position to determine that the reactor could be 
operated safely."FN49 
 The common denominator among the troublesome areas cited was the inability to ensure 
the necessary cooperation of either the recipient nation or the nation manufacturing supplemental 
parts of the nuclear reactor. First, the Board complained that verification of the data on the char-
acteristics of the site of the new plant, an essential element of the domestic review process, 
would be impossible without the consent of the foreign government.FN50 According to the 
Board, such a review would require site inspections and investigations that would likely be 
viewed as intrusions on sovereign authority.FN51 Second, the Board argued that a review of the 
exported plant's safety would be impossible given the common practice among recipient nations 
of purchasing only a portion of the required equipment for reactors from any one exporter.FN52 
Third, the Board claimed that the NRC could not complete essential parts of the review process, 
such as the inspection of the plant as it is being built and the periodic inspection of the plant as it 
is being operated, since the NRC has no continuing regulatory jurisdiction over activities associ-
ated with the project once the export license is issued and the U.S.-manufactured parts are 
shipped.FN53 Inextricably linked to this problem of continuing regulatory jurisdiction was the 
absence of control over the selection and training of natives of the recipient nation to manage and 
operate the reactor.FN54 In conclusion, the NRC stated that because it could not make a mean-
ingful safety review of exported nuclear power plants, its limited resources [pg1025] should be 
devoted to domestic nuclear licensing activities.FN55 
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 Commissioner Bradford submitted a vigorous dissent.FN56 He found that the U.S. self-
interest and responsibility as a supplier of a potentially dangerous technology weighed far heav-
ier than the Philippine interest in state sovereignty.FN57 Bradford argued, therefore, that the 
NRC had a duty to complete as comprehensive a review of the exported reactor's safety as possi-
ble and to share the results of that review with the Philippine government.FN58 A major element 
of the review would be to determine whether the export could be licensed in the U.S. according 
to NRC standards.FN59 In only extreme cases did Bradford foresee such a review being the ba-
sis for a denial of an export license.FN60 Bradford stated that except when it was necessary to 
attach conditions to the export, the review "would presume the intelligent self-interest of the re-
cipient nation."FN61 Seemingly encouraged by Bradford's dissent, the Philippine Movement for 
Environmental Protection and various U.S. public interest and environmental organizations ap-
pealed the NRC's jurisdictional determination to the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit.FN62 Just as Commissioner Bradford's dissent neglected to cite inter-
national law, the petitioners on appeal also overlooked the relevance of that body of law. The 
petitioners limited their arguments for NRC review of the foreign impacts of nuclear reactor ex-
ports to U.S. domestic law.FN63 Nevertheless, the petitioners did address the NRC Board's na-
tional sovereignty argument. They first argued that the proposed review posed no threat to the 
sovereignty of the Philippines, because it did not compel the extraterritorial application of U.S. 
law. The statutes applicable to the NRC's conduct in the present case, the [pg1026] petitioners 
explained, affect only the issuance of a license to export nuclear equipment from the U.S. and 
thus "regulate conduct occurring solely in the United States." FN64 The petitioners also disputed 
the NRC's contention that the Philippines would regard the review as an intrusion or would re-
fuse to cooperate with NRC scientists. As a basis for their belief, the petitioners listed earlier co-
operative actions on the part of the Philippines.FN65 These included allowing a series of ongo-
ing site inspections by U.S. officials pursuant to the requirements of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA), and the release to the NRC of information calling into ques-
tion the reactor's safety.FN66 
 Despite these arguments, the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the NRC licensing 
decision.FN67 The court, in an opinion written by Judge Wilkey, held that the agency had prop-
erly approved the exported reactor without evaluating the health, safety, and environmental im-
pacts of the reactor within the recipient nation or upon U.S. interests.FN68 Of overarching im-
portance to the decision was the position of the Philippine government. Contrary to petitioner's 
assertions, the Philippine government submitted an amicus brief claiming that the Philippines 
would regard a refusal by the NRC to license the reactor export as an unwarranted intrusion into 
matters over which the Philippine government had exclusive responsibility.FN69 The essence of 
Judge Wilkey's opinion was that where, as here, the Congressional mandate is vague as to the 
exact jurisdiction of the NRC's licensing determinations, any interest the U.S. has in reviewing 
the health, safety, and environmental impact abroad of a nuclear export must give way to two 
stronger interests: the Philippines's own regulatory [pg1027] interest, and the U.S. interest in 
promoting its role as a predictable nuclear energy supplier for nonproliferation goals.FN70 
 Implicit in the court's holding was a recognition of the potential anticompetitive effects of 
a mandated review procedure.FN71 Such a procedure might discourage the purchase of U.S. nu-
clear equipment due to the increased cost of U.S. equipment and the necessity of engaging in co-
operation with U.S. regulatory authorities. The consequence, of which the NRC must have been 
aware, would be to cripple the U.S. nuclear export market with no apparent advantage to third 
world purchasers who would most likely buy their nuclear supplies from other exporting nations 
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that require little or no regulatory review of the exported equipment. There is, therefore, no in-
centive on the part of the U.S. to do a complete safety review. 
 The U.S. administrative and judicial decisions to renounce any U.S. obligation to review 
the safety of exported reactors illustrates that under the current domestic law of most nuclear ex-
porting nations, exporters have license to do what is illogical and morally reprehensible. Yet, 
certainly from the viewpoint of preserving state sovereignty interests, such a renunciation is not 
necessary. As Commissioner Bradford's dissent noted, a U.S. review of the safety of the West-
inghouse export would be no more intrusive than the nonproliferation reviews exporting nations 
are committed to perform pursuant to the London Supplier Guidelines and the Nonproliferation 
Treaty.FN72 Furthermore, the NRC has the information needed to complete aspects of the re-
view process that are potentially of great importance to safety. [pg1028] It possesses the ability 
to warn a recipient nation of known defects in the design of certain domestically manufactured 
plants. In the Philippine case, for example, the NRC could have alerted the Philippines of West-
inghouse's past problems with core-cooling systems. Of course, not all regulation of the siting, 
design, construction, and operation of a nuclear power plant is entirely within the competence of 
the exporting nation's regulatory agency and domestic licensing procedures. For instance, the 
exporting nation is not equipped to review the safety implications of a plant where domestically 
produced parts are synthesized with foreign-made parts. 
 The Philippine case indicates that there exists a spectrum of safety issues involved in the 
generation of nuclear power, ranging from those most capable of being regulated on the domestic 
level to those encompassing such a diversity of manufacturing designs and unique geologic and 
regulatory circumstances as to mandate international regulation. The Philippine case also demon-
strates that there is no incentive for a domestic exporter to do a complete safety review when it is 
likely to result in the loss of the domestic sale to a foreign nuclear power manufacturer. 
 
III. THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGULATION: 
THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 A state that exports, or allows to be exported, dangerous technology to another state may 
arguably be liable under the international law of "state responsibility," regardless of the fact that 
the injury occurs outside the exporting nation's territory and involves foreign nationals, rather 
than citizens of the state. We begin with the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Third): 
 
A state is responsible under international law for injury to a national of another state caused by an official 
act or omission that violates 
(a) a human right that, under § 701, a state is obligated to respect for all persons subject to its authority; 
(b) a personal right that, under international law, a state is obligated to respect for individuals of foreign na-
tionality;. . . . FN73 
 
  [pg1029] This proposition obviously could be applied to nuclear exports, provided that 
the injured nationals in R have a personal right under international law that has been violated by 
E. The claim of those individuals, in accordance with the Restatement's rule, would be that E 
wrongfully omitted to ensure that its nuclear exports met certain standards of safety. Because the 
exports failed to meet those standards, a nuclear accident occurred which resulted in harm to the 
individuals residing within R. 
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 This summary statement, however, is tautological. The question we address in this paper 
is do those individuals have such a right that is protected by international law? And it, in turn, 
gives rise to a threshold inquiry: does the "territorial" principle in international law stand as an 
insuperable barrier at the very outset of our analysis? 
 Territoriality is nearly synonymous in the minds of many writers with the doctrine of 
state responsibility, upon which we shall ground our argument. This doctrine traditionally has 
two faces; it absolves a state from liability for acts occurring outside its boundaries, but holds a 
state responsible for the external effects of acts commenced within its boundaries. It may strike 
some as surprising, therefore, that the comments and reporter's notes to the above-quoted Re-
statement section do not specify that an injury to the national of another state must take place in 
the injuring state. We shall argue that the reporter's failure to specify which territory is at issue is 
indeed a proper modern interpretation of the doctrine of state responsibility for two reasons. 
First, the location of the harm is not intrinsic to the doctrine of state responsibility even as classi-
cally conceived. Second, developments in areas of international human rights law have eroded 
the classical reason for territoriality, at least when fundamental human rights are impli-
cated.FN74 Before taking up these reasons, we must deal briefly with the content of the princi-
ples of state responsibility. 
[pg1030] A. Principles of State Responsibility 
 The doctrine of state responsibility is composed of two fundamental principles. Under the 
first, the principle of the international minimum standard of treatment, aliens are entitled to a cer-
tain minimum standard of treatment that is invariant across international frontiers.FN75 Under 
the second principle of state responsibility, nonnationals may not be discriminated against in 
their basic human rights as compared to the treatment of nationals.FN76 
 
1. International minimum standard of treatment. 
 
 The principle of the international minimum standard of treatment stands for the proposi-
tion that nonnationals are entitled to a certain minimum standard of treatment by the host state. 
This principle evolved from the norm referred to as "denial of justice," applied in egregious cases 
involving gross denials of justice: denying the accused the right to defend himself, not allowing 
the accused to call witnesses in his own behalf, double jeopardy, and control of the tribunal by 
the executive.FN77 Later cases transmuted the "denial of justice" norm into "ordinary standards 
of civilization" and extended it beyond the courtroom.FN78 
  [pg1031] The concept of denial of justice was broadened considerably by the inclusion of 
acts by legislative and administrative branches of government.FN79 However, the standard for 
finding an administrative denial of justice was quite high. The majority in the Neer Case stated 
that "the treatment of an alien . . . should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of 
duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international standards that 
every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency."FN80 The concur-
ring commissioner, Commissioner Nielsen from the United States, favored [pg1032] an easier 
standard: "the propriety of governmental acts should be determined according to ordinary stan-
dards of civilization, even though standards differ considerably among members of the family of 
nations, equal under the law."FN81 
 Although the General Claims Commission in the Neer Case found the police conduct in-
ternationally sufficient, the Commission has found otherwise in numerous cases employing the 
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tests set forth by the majority and the concurrence.FN82 In the Faulkner Case, for example, the 
Mexican treatment of an American prisoner was found to be internationally insufficient.FN83 In 
the Mallen Case, the U.S. was held liable for injury to a Mexican consul because U.S. failure to 
execute the penalty imposed upon the American responsible for the injury constituted a denial of 
justice.FN84 Other cases establish that a state can incur liability for illegal arrest, failure to ac-
count for a suspect under custody, failure of police to control a civilian riot, and arbitrary control 
of individual property.FN85 These administrative cases exemplify the proposition that adequate 
police protection, such that an alien is neither harassed by the authorities nor left to the mercy of 
unruly mobs, and respect for land ownership, are necessary for compliance with the international 
minimum standard. 
  [pg1033] The foregoing cases illustrate a gradual broadening of the principle of the in-
ternational minimum standard of treatment from its genesis in the earliest egregious examples of 
denial of justice to the more inclusive doctrine now known as the international minimum stan-
dard of treatment of nonnationals. The principle is still limited by a certain notion of nondepriva-
tion of "justice" to such persons, but the concept of "justice" itself has been expanded, in accor-
dance with gradually evolving norms of responsibility to others. Its content is no longer confined 
to the judicial context, but can now embrace legislative and administrative denials of justice. The 
term "justice" is gaining content as the international community perceives a greater degree of 
civilized treatment as part of its standard conception of "justice." 
 
2. Standard of nondiscrimination. 
 
 In conjunction with the principle of the international minimum standard of treatment, the 
law of state responsibility has from the outset included a second principle—that of nondiscrimi-
natory treatment of nonnationals. This standard was never meant to accord nonnationals the same 
rights and privileges accorded citizens.FN86 But it has had the operative effect of raising the 
rights of aliens, because if the level of treatment accorded an alien falls significantly below the 
level of national treatment, the alien can claim a denial of justice. Hence, due to the relationship 
between the nondiscriminatory standard and the international minimum standard, an alien is enti-
tled to whichever standard is higher. The legal relationship between the minimum standard and 
the nondiscrimination principle was given expression by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit in the context of the nationalization of property. In Banco Nacional de 
[pg1034] Cuba v. Sabbatino (later reversed on other grounds by the Supreme Court),FN87 the 
Second Circuit held that international law required that a state have a "reasonable basis" for dif-
ferential treatment of aliens.FN88 Cuba gave distinctive treatment to non-Cubans when it na-
tionalized an American sugar company ten weeks before it nationalized Cuban companies in or-
der to retaliate against a reduction in American sugar imports from Cuba.FN89 The court held 
that this was not a "reasonable basis for a distinction in treatment" of non-Cubans and hence was 
a violation of international law.FN90 Thus we might infer from the court's reasoning that the 
nondiscriminatory treatment standard in the law of state responsibility creates a presumption in 
favor of according aliens equal treatment with nationals, except when a "reasonable basis" can be 
adduced for according aliens a lower level of treatment. In this fashion, the principle of nondis-
crimination appears to give a certain progressive element to the principle of the international 
minimum standard.FN91 A nation may accord international minimum treatment to an alien and 
nevertheless violate the alien's rights if the alien is blatantly discriminated against in comparison 
to citizens. In this manner the content of the international minimum standard itself might be 
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raised over time, progressively affected in the Sabbatino fashion by the utilization of the nondis-
criminatory treatment standard.FN92 
  [pg1035] Similarly, a nation may be guilty of falling below the international minimum 
standard even though it has complied with the nondiscrimination standard. Accordingly, it is not 
an adequate defense to a charge of failing to meet the international minimum standard to say that 
aliens have received the same treatment as that accorded to nationals. In this respect, one is better 
off, under the classical view of state responsibility, being an alien than being a citizen. The alien 
is entitled to the international minimum standard of treatment, even though a citizen under ex-
actly the same circumstances is without standing to claim an entitlement to the international 
minimum standard.FN93 
B. Extraterritorial Application of State Responsibility: The Threshold Question 
1. No doctrinal limitation to territorial harms. 
 There is nothing intrinsic to the doctrine of state responsibility that confines it to territo-
rial applications. Vattel, generally credited with first articulating the doctrine, wrote in 1785 that: 
 Whoever uses a citizen ill, indirectly offends the State, which ought to protect this citi-
zen, and his sovereign should revenge the injuries, punish the aggressor, and, if possible, oblige 
him to make entire satisfaction; since otherwise the citizen would not obtain the great end of the 
civil association, which is safety.FN94 
 Under this classical view, the harm to the nonnational becomes an injury to the nonna-
tional's state. Under the modern law of human rights, however, the injury to the state is seen as 
an unnecessary addition to the individual's claim.FN95 Yet, under either the classic or the mod-
ern view, what is striking is what is omitted: the requirement that the harm occur in the offending 
state's territory. The location of the [pg1036] harm was apparently as unimportant to Vattel as it 
is to the authors of the current Restatement of Foreign Policy Law who, as we have seen, do not 
distinguish between territorial and extraterritorial applications of section 711.FN96 Of course, it 
is quite possible that Vattel simply did not consider the problem of extraterritorial harm. The 
same cannot be said, however, of the Restatement's drafters.FN97 
 To be sure, the doctrine of state responsibility has been implicitly tied to a state's territory 
through the argument that the doctrine is necessary to equip the nonnational with the protection 
afforded the national through his participation in the political process. The publicist Edwin Bor-
chard noted that "[i]t has been argued that one reason why the alien is not bound to submit to un-
just and unredressed treatment equally with nationals is because the latter is presumed to have a 
political remedy, whereas the alien's inability to exercise political rights deprives him of one of 
the principal safeguards of the citizens."FN98 This argument might suggest that an alien needs 
legal safeguards in a foreign territory precisely because he is denied a political voice. Yet, upon 
analysis, the argument does not necessarily confine itself to aliens within the host country's terri-
tory. An alien outside the host country's territory harmed by the host country is equally unable to 
exert a political voice; indeed, he may even be more disabled than an alien who is within the na-
tion's territory (who might presumably have the political "clout" of association with ethnic 
groups, some of whom are naturalized citizens, as well as the "clout" of his own nation's consular 
office). Hence Borchard's distinction does not justify drawing a line at a nation's boundary.FN99 
 Under a more modern reformulation of the law of state responsibility, it is apparent that 
what is significant is whether the acts that cause harm to an alien are attributable to the state. Al-
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though the judicial precedents typically involve acts that occur within the territory of the state, it 
is clear that the location of the acts is unimportant compared [pg1037] to the need for attribution 
to the state. A state may, for example, act outside its own territory, as when its agents abroad 
maltreat a nonnational.FN100 Although the location of the acts constituting a tort is significant 
in terms of choice-of-law questions, these questions come up only when the issue concerns 
which national tort law to apply. However, because international law is not a choice-of-law sys-
tem, it inherently applies equally to all nations, and the location of tortious acts is irrelevant.  
FN101 Hence, focusing upon the attribution of the acts rather than their location seems necessary 
given the nature of international law; to do otherwise would be to introduce illogical distinctions 
that would tend to destroy any claim that international law has total universality. FN102 
2. State responsibility for abnormally hazardous activities conducted within a state's terri-
tory: A foundation for liability for extraterritorial activities. 
 In the preceding section we made the general case for the irrelevance of territorial distinc-
tions in the law of state responsibility. We now make the narrower argument that territoriality is 
irrelevant at least where abnormally hazardous activities are concerned. There is an increasing 
willingness on the part of publicists to recognize the international liability of states whose activi-
ties cause harm to foreign nationals or expose foreign nationals to an unacceptable degree or risk 
of harm. Two commentators in particular would assign liability to states whose activities cause 
harm to foreign nationals outside the state's own boundaries, despite the impact that such a rule 
might have in placing legal limitations upon activities conducted entirely within the nation's ter-
ritory.FN103 
 One commentator, Gunther Handl, has attempted to answer whether, given the accompa-
nying risk, the siting of an abnormally [pg1038] dangerous activity (such as a nuclear power 
plant) on a state's international border is unlawful under international law. FN104 Handl explores 
the significant implications of this question on the doctrine of territorial sovereignty. FN105 
Finding that decisions of international tribunals only indicate an awareness of the problem of the 
creation of unacceptable transnational risk, while providing no clear standard for determining 
their legality, Handl bases his own assessment upon actual state practice. FN106 He concludes 
that when the risk of harm posed by an activity reaches a certain magnitude, the siting of the ac-
tivity violates international law, regardless of the low probability that harm will ever occur. 
FN107 In essence, Handl finds that a second type of sovereignty, that of a state's right to be free 
from external harm, prevails over the first aspect, a state's sovereign authority to conduct any ac-
tivity not per se illegal within its own territory. 
 Professor Handl never directly addresses whether a state sustains liability for harm suf-
fered by foreign nationals as the result of extraterritorial activities. FN108 Nevertheless, his con-
clusion in part supports our thesis because it discredits the major stumbling block to imposing 
[pg1039] state liability for extraterritorial harm, that of the traditional doctrine of territorial sov-
ereignty, or Handl's "first aspect" of the sovereignty doctrine. Moreover, Handl's "second as-
pect," which prevails over the first, is consistent with a regime imposing liability for extraterrito-
rial activities such as the exportation of unsafe nuclear power plants. The right to be free from 
external harm under Handl's "second aspect" can easily be translated into the right to be free of 
the infliction of harm that results from exported hazardous nuclear power plants. Handl thus lays 
a particularistic foundation for the imposition of international liability for extraterritorial activi-
ties such as nuclear power exportation. 
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 The second commentator favoring the assignment of liability to states whose activities 
cause harm to foreign nationals outside the state's own boundaries is the International Law 
Commission itself. A recent series of its reports, written by Robert Quentin-Baxter, former Spe-
cial Rapporteur to the Commission, reaches the same general conclusion as Handl. FN109 The 
Commission intended to study those activities not per se illegal under international law, but 
which, when conducted by a state within its own territory, cause injury to the persons or property 
of a neighboring state. FN110 In the "schematic outline" or list of rules prepared in one of the 
reports, Quentin-Baxter concludes that a state is liable for injuries to foreign persons or property 
caused by its activities. FN111 He grounds this liability upon an implicit balance between the 
two aspects of territorial sovereignty discussed by Handl, FN112 and reaches as a synthesis the 
classic principle of sic utere [pg1040] tuo ut alienum non laedas—the duty to exercise one's 
rights in ways that do not harm the interests of others. FN113 
 Thus the Commission follows Handl in qualifying a state's sovereign territorial right to 
conduct hazardous activities on its own territory. This can be interpreted as laying the ground-
work for the imposition of state liability for extraterritorial activities. Unlike Handl, however, 
Quentin-Baxter expressly excludes such extraterritorial application. But his rationale for the ex-
clusion seems to be motivated by political rather than legal concerns: he pleads that the Commis-
sion mandated a limitation of the scope of the topic to territorial uses of the environment. FN114 
This limitation was apparently not the result of an objective determination of the content of cus-
tomary international law. 
 If Quentin-Baxter wanted to proceed slowly for political reasons, and if we are correct 
that there is neither a logical nor a legal basis for excluding extraterritorial activities, then the 
Commission's conclusion about territoriality is significantly less important than its insistence that 
the scope of traditional liability be enlarged for activities that are abnormally dangerous. Later 
commentary reveals that the imposition of liability upon states for injuries resulting from their 
extraterritorial activities was, to Quentin-Baxter, politically unacceptable. Underlying Quentin-
Baxter's focus on physical activities within the territory or control of the state was his belief that 
"states remain primarily accountable" for things that happen within their own territory, and that 
importing nations can protect themselves from the harmful consequences of importing hazardous 
technology by conditioning their import upon the exporting state's retention of liability. FN115 
Of course, this position not only rejects the harm approach, but it begs the question [pg1041] 
whether, under international law, the population of state R has a right against E apart from any 
express warranty that R may obtain. 
 Professor Magraw takes issue with what he sees as Quentin-Baxter's unrealistic view of 
developing nations' freedom to reject imported technology, though he also prefers the Commis-
sion's "physical activity" approach over a "harm" approach. FN116 Professor Magraw sees the 
transfer that results from the "harm" approach—shifting liability for injuries caused by unsafe 
technological exports from the importing state to the exporting state—as affecting negatively 
technology transfers and thus "hamper[ing] the efforts of developing states to modernize and de-
crease their dependency on imports." FN117 If Magraw is saying that by reducing the rights of 
smaller nations we encourage them to become self-sufficient, his views appear to be radically 
paternalistic. Instead he may be making the claim of an automobile manufacturer's spokesperson: 
that a strict liability rule will require the manufacturer to build safer cars that will necessarily be 
more expensive, thus depriving X number of people who cannot afford the marginal cost increase 
from having a car at all. But the hidden premise in this claim is that X people are willing to ac-
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cept unsafe cars. It is true that standard economic analysis postulates a tradeoff between safety 
and cost, but such analysis is typically court centered; it tends to overlook the legislative initia-
tives and administrative controls that define and enforce general safety standards on behalf of the 
public. 
 We concede that the liability rule we advocate in the present essay may result in fewer 
nuclear power plants being exported. However, given the magnitude of the potential harm, we 
contend that a careful shaping of the liability rule according to the principles of the minimum 
standard and nondiscrimination will result in eliminating from export the unsafe plants. Further-
more, unlike the automobile example, here the ultimate consumers—the people of the importing 
countries—are only indirectly, if at all, involved in the import decision. The [pg1042] human 
rights component of international law would therefore have to take into account the possibility 
that they are operating with less than fully informed consumer freedom. Finally, if Magraw is 
making a legal argument as opposed to stating a policy preference, he is making an impermissi-
ble distinction between states depending upon their degree of relative economic development—a 
distinction which has no basis in the general norms of customary international law. FN118 
C. The Imperatives of Extraterritorial Justice 
 Heretofore we have argued the case for applying the doctrine of state responsibility to ex-
traterritorial harms. Our goal has been to prove that territoriality is no longer a bar to interna-
tional liability schemes. Our next task is to explore the bases of an affirmative duty owed by na-
tions to nonnationals living in foreign nations. Is there a positive obligation under international 
law to do justice to nonnationals residing outside one's own territory such that failing to do so 
would be a "denial of justice" to them within the concept of the law of state responsibility? 
While we necessarily deal with this question generally, the present basis for our concern is 
whether exporting nations owe a duty to do justice to the populations of the importing nations 
that could be reflected in liability for exporting technology that falls below a given safety stan-
dard. 
 Our first inquiry should be whether a state generally has any moral obligation to do jus-
tice to the nationals of another state. Clearly, justice, as H.L.A. Hart puts it, is a branch of moral-
ity. FN119 It shares with morality the notion that factors of time and space are irrelevant. FN120 
In this respect, a national boundary is an artificial, as well as a morally irrelevant, boundary with 
respect to moral obligations. 
 We must next inquire whether there are transboundary moral obligations that also consti-
tute legal obligations arising out of customary law. The international law of war contains moral 
obligations that are also legal obligations to citizens in foreign countries; most of the [pg1043] 
prohibitions against war crimes fall into this category. FN121 It follows that in peacetime, a gen-
eral moral obligation deriving from customary international law is conceptually possible. Spe-
cific examples are the fundamental human-rights prohibitions against torture, genocide, and en-
slavement. FN122 
 Our question therefore becomes whether the obligation to do justice is encompassed 
within the general legal obligations under international law owed to nonnationals in foreign 
countries. We can only conclude provisionally that the obligation to do justice extraterritorially, 
although part of our general moral obligation as human beings, may or may not be part of cus-
tomary international law as it has developed up to the present. Yet, the obligation to do justice 
extraterritorially is clearly not excluded by any customary international law norm. Moreover, it is 
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consistent with the legal obligation to behave morally toward nonnationals in other countries, 
with respect to particular moral obligations (again, human rights, humanitarian laws of war) that 
have developed in customary international law. 
 Accordingly, we proceed to a third and more particularized inquiry: what conditions must 
exist to give rise to an extraterritorial obligation to do justice? No such conditions can be found 
in Aristotle's classic analysis of justice in the Nicomachean Ethics. FN123 Aristotle's analysis of 
justice on its own terms would be contradicted by any thesis that justice is not owed by one per-
son to another because that other person is situated in a different polity. 
 The post-seventeenth century social contract theorists ostensibly stand for a different 
proposition: that justice is only relevant within a particular society. True, the writings of Bodin, 
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau do not explicitly confine justice to relationships within a given 
society or legal system, but their emphasis on "sovereignty" may be a surrogate for such a view. 
FN124 We will examine this question [pg1044] below in the writings of their modern counter-
part, John Rawls. 
 Yet the "fathers" of international law, although heavily influenced by the doctrines of 
sovereignty and social contract, had a considerably more expansive view of transnational justice. 
Because of the relative unfamiliarity of this aspect of the theories of Grotius, Pufendorf, Suarez, 
and Vattel, FN125 their views are worth brief recitation here. 
 Grotius argued that kings "have the right of demanding punishments not only on account 
of injuries committed against themselves or their subjects, but also on account of injuries which 
do not directly affect them but excessively violate the law of nature or of nations in regard to any 
persons whatsoever." FN126 
 Even though Pufendorf was not prepared to go as far as Grotius in advocating military in-
tervention on behalf of nonnationals in egregious cases, he too recognized cases where subjects, 
persecuted with no semblance of justice by their own ruler, would have a right of forcible resis-
tance. FN127 In such cases foreign kings could lawfully come to the military assistance of such 
persons. FN128 And Suarez, perhaps the greatest of the Catholic jurists, said that war might be 
waged on behalf of aliens abroad on condition that they would independently be "justified" in 
avenging themselves. FN129 
  [pg1045] Although Vattel placed much more emphasis on "sovereignty" than did Grotius, 
his view of the duty to do justice was similarly universal: 
The universal society of the human race being an institution of nature herself, that is to say, a necessary 
consequence of the nature of man, all men, in whatever station they are placed, are bound to cultivate it, and to 
discharge its duties. They cannot liberate themselves from the obligation by any convention or by any private 
association. When, therefore, they unite in civil society for the purpose of forming a separate state or nation 
they may indeed enter into particular engagements towards those with whom they associate themselves; but 
they remain still bound to the performance of their duties towards the rest of mankind; All the difference con-
sists in this, that having agreed to act in common, and having resigned their rights and submitted their will to the 
body of the society, in everything that concerns their common welfare, it thenceforth belongs to that body, that 
state, and its rulers, to fulfill the duties of humanity towards strangers, in every thing that no longer depends 
upon the liberty of individuals, and it is the state more particularly that is to perform these duties towards other 
states. FN130 
 Although Vattel erected a strong presumption against external interference in the affairs 
of government in a state, FN131 he wrote that "if the prince, by violating the fundamental laws, 
gives his subjects a legal right to resist him, if tyranny, by becoming unsupportable obliges the 
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nation to rise in their own defense, every foreign power has a right to succour an oppressed peo-
ple who implore their assistance." FN132 
 After Vattel, leading international law publicists from Wolff to Oppenheim increasingly 
adopted a statist or Hegelian conception of sovereignty that simply failed to address considera-
tions of transboundary justice. The twentieth century has seen the pendulum swing back, fueled 
by the revolutionary conception of international human rights. FN133 At the present time we 
may say that the classic positions of Grotius, Pufendorf, Suarez, and Vattel have renewed vital-
ity, after the century or so of dormancy under the statist conception. 
  [pg1046] Nevertheless, social-contract notions continue to cause problems for advocates 
of transnational justice, if only for the philosophically contingent circumstance that theorists of 
the social contract have tended to confine their analyses to particular states or societies. The lead-
ing modern example is John Rawls, who in his A Theory of Justice, FN134 written in 1971, in-
vokes social contract ideology to explicate justice obligations among citizens within a single so-
ciety. To be sure, his conception of the "original position," in which persons argue for their mu-
tual rights and obligations without knowledge of the social position into which they will be born, 
could be considered to be equally consistent with lack of knowledge of what country into which 
they will be born. But when Rawls addresses international law, he unaccountably shifts from a 
discussion of persons to a discussion of representatives of states. FN135 Suddenly he is discuss-
ing states as if they were persons. FN136 As a result, there is a tension in Rawls's work between 
the rights of persons in a just society and the rights of states in a just international society, for 
states' rights are not the same as the rights of individuals within states. 
 On the other hand, Rawls's moral imperatives call for an expansion of effect that logically 
could not stop at a nation's edge. This is evidenced by his characterizations of the universal traits 
of persons (which he calls "moral sentiments") and his axiom of the universality of principles: 
"[P]rinciples are to be universal in application. They must hold for everyone in virtue of their 
being moral persons." FN137 
 Given this tension in Rawls's theory, is there any way to interpret it as addressing the 
question of whether there is an obligation upon persons or states to do justice internationally? 
Charles Beitz suggests an interesting approach. FN138 Professor Beitz points out that Rawls re-
gards justice as applying in situations where benefits and burdens are produced by "social coop-
eration." FN139 But because people within society may not always cooperate in social activity, 
and each person is [pg1047] not necessarily always advantaged by social activity, Beitz reformu-
lates Rawls's baseline contextual requirement as follows: "[T]he requirements of justice apply to 
institutions and practices (whether or not they are genuinely cooperative) in which social activity 
produces relative or absolute benefits or burdens that would not exist if the social activity did not 
take place." FN140 Beitz's reformulation persuasively captures the philosophic underpinnings of 
Rawls's prescriptions. It is a functional, as opposed to a categoric, definition of the social interac-
tions that Rawls posits as the unit for social justice. As such, it clearly encompasses transbound-
ary relations so long as they in fact produce benefits or burdens that would not exist absent the 
social activity. 
 Obviously, the degree to which nations interact will then be a critical determinant of the 
scope of the justice obligation. Nations that share a common boundary, that constantly exchange 
goods, services, and visitors, and maintain a high degree of mutual investment in each other's 
industries, will under this analysis have a much higher degree of duty to do justice than nations 
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that are only casual trading partners. This higher degree can indeed approach a duty of distribu-
tive justice for which Professor Beitz has argued. Distributive justice is clearly the most demand-
ing of the forms of justice, requiring persons to share their surplus goods (or services) with the 
less fortunate. Rawls's book primarily addresses distributive justice in its delineation of the "dif-
ference principle": "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are . . . to 
the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. . . ." FN141 
 But is such a high level of sacrifice, as exemplified by distributive justice, necessary in 
state relations under Beitz's theories? The answer seems to be no. One of the bedrock concep-
tions of justice, emphasized by Aristotle and institutionalized in all of the world's legal systems, 
is compensatory justice: the requirement that a person who causes injury to another owes that 
other person financial compensation. FN142 In every legal system of which we are aware, this 
principle of justice forms the basis for private lawsuits. FN143 Its pervasiveness [pg1048] and 
fundamentality are manifest. The question is, however, when does compensatory justice apply? 
 Since the notion of compensatory justice is far more elementary than the notion of dis-
tributive justice, and since it requires far less in the way of individual sacrifice (indeed, one 
might argue that it involves no sacrifice at all because it is merely compensation for an advantage 
taken that harmed another), the level of social interaction upon which such a duty of compensa-
tory justice may be based is far lower than that which would give rise to a duty of distributive 
justice. Indeed, applying Professor Beitz's analysis of the basis of the social-contractarian sys-
tem, the social activity of the sale of goods (here, the export of nuclear power plant technology) 
necessarily produces relative or absolute benefits or burdens that would not exist if the social ac-
tivity did not take place. If that social activity is not taken to give rise to the strong obligation of 
distributive justice advocated by Beitz, at the very least it gives rise to the weak obligation to 
render compensatory justice. 
 Arguably, even a single export of a nuclear power plant from E to R invokes Beitz's rela-
tionship theory. Because of the magnitude of potential harm resulting from malfunction of the 
technology, the people of R are in a particularly dependent relationship with E; their safety and 
their lives are potentially in E's hands. In this respect, nuclear power plant exports are distin-
guishable from most other exports. Even a single export of a nuclear power plant carries with it a 
greater social responsibility than would a stream of exports of household appliances or television 
sets. 
 We have thus argued that the very act of import-export creates a relationship between the 
parties that on a social-contractarian view of justice—and certainly upon an Aristotelian view—
gives rise to expectations of, and a duty of, doing justice, at the very least in the minimal form of 
compensatory justice. The obligation to compensate the purchasing party for damages resulting 
from the installation and use [pg1049] of a dangerous product (a nuclear power plant) is an obli-
gation within the modern and generally accepted notion of "justice." Thus, it would be a denial 
of justice not to furnish compensation to an injured party in appropriate circumstances. FN144 
 What would be appropriate circumstances is not a matter of legal or moral philosophy, 
but rather is a matter of the application of the customary international law of state responsibility 
to the exportation of nuclear power plant technology. We therefore move to a discussion of the 
application of the principles of minimum international standard and nondiscriminatory treatment 
to the extraterritorial context of malfunctions of exported nuclear power plant technologies and 
injury resulting therefrom. 
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IV. APPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
TO NUCLEAR POWER EXPORTATION 
 
A. Types of Safety Problems 
 We have argued thus far that the classic doctrine of "state responsibility" should be ap-
plied extraterritorially to the exportation of nuclear power plant technology. We now explore the 
applicability of the two components of the doctrine of "state responsibility" to the specific safety 
problems of nuclear power plant technology exports. We will consider three generic types of 
safety problems involved in nuclear power plant technology so that we may then apply the rele-
vant norms of international law to each type of safety concern: 
 TYPE I: A plant designed for export that does not meet domestic standards for design or 
safety systems. 
 TYPE II: An inherently dangerous plant designed for the purpose of export. For example, 
one could argue that the graphite system used in the Chernobyl nuclear power plant is inherently 
dangerous for use in an exported power plant. The Chernobyl plant did not contain the extensive 
concrete shielding common to U.S. nuclear plants. FN145 Type II thus refers to the kind of de-
signs that for whatever reasons are acceptable domestically, but that may nevertheless pose too 
significant [pg1050] a safety hazard if exported without the additional safeguards required by the 
domestic law of the exporting country. 
 TYPE III: A plant that was manufactured negligently. A negligently manufactured cool-
ing system, for example, might pose an unacceptable health hazard, even though the cooling sys-
tem itself could render a plant reasonably safe if it were constructed nonnegligently. 
 With these three types of safety issues in mind, let us now turn to the two principles of 
state responsibility. 
B. The International Minimum Standard 
 We contend that under the international minimum standard, E could theoretically be li-
able for all damages incurred by R (its population and property) for a nuclear power plant "acci-
dent" caused by any of the three types of safety problems outlined above. Type II accidents pose 
the strongest case for E's prima facie liability, while legal and evidentiary arguments can be ad-
vanced that could diminish or curtail liability with respect to Type I and Type III accidents. 
 A Type I accident does not of itself make out an international claim. Nuclear power that 
does not meet E's own domestic safety standards may or may not meet international standards. 
Consider, for example, a catastrophic meltdown of the technology exported by E and situated in 
nation R. R could conceivably argue that the fact that the exported technology failed to meet E's 
domestic standards proves that it was so unsafe that it also fell below the international minimum 
standard. Such an argument, while theoretically possible, is subject to two significant counter-
vailing legal considerations. First, assuming that an international minimum standard exists, its 
content would be independent of any one nation's domestic safety standards. E's internal stan-
dards might indeed be above, below, or at the international minimum level.FN146 Second, as-
suming that an international [pg1051] minimum standard exists and that it was violated by E's 
exportation, E and R would equally share the guilt. If E violated the international minimum stan-
dard by exporting the technology, R violated it by importing the technology. It would therefore 
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be difficult for R to argue that E should be liable to R. Further, if the people of R were to sue E, E 
should be able to implead R as a joint tortfeasor. FN147 
 These legal obstacles regarding attempts to establish E's liability under the international 
minimum standard in the Type I situation come out differently in the Type II and III situations. 
Under both Type II and Type III, E has reason to know, based on expertise and experience, that 
R would subject its population to unacceptable risk if it were to proceed to construct such a plant. 
 Also, whereas the Type I model requires that an international standard have a specific 
content and be at a higher level than E's domestic standard, in the Type II and Type III cases the 
content of the international minimum standard need only be shown to coincide with general prin-
ciples of tort liability. In other words, the international minimum standard need only comport 
with the principle that intentional delivery to a user of an unsafe and extremely hazardous prod-
uct subjects the deliverer to liability for foreseeable damages. Thus, under Type II, if E allows 
the export of power plant technology that is designed to be emplaced in high, dry, and rocky ter-
rain, knowing that R will erect the plant in a low, wet, coastal area, E arguably violates the inter-
national minimum standard. Or, under Type III, if the officials of E, in approving the exportation 
of certain nuclear power plant technology, know or have reason to know that it was designed or 
manufactured negligently (perhaps so as to reduce drastically design or manufacturing costs), E 
is arguably liable to the people of R in the event of an accident that was the foreseeable result of 
such negligence. Certainly the officials of E are in a better position to know about such negli-
gence than are the officials of R. Indeed, the higher and more complex the technology, the more 
the manufacturer will [pg1052] know about its potential defects, and the less the purchaser can 
possibly know. 
 To posit theoretical liability, however, is a long way from claiming that such liability is 
easily proven. Indeed, only in the most egregious situations could actual liability be shown, even 
in Type II and Type III situations. In Type II situations in particular, an international consensus 
among experts that the design is inherently too dangerous to be used in the way that the receiving 
nation plans to use it needs to be shown. And the evidentiary problems inherent in proving a 
plant part was negligently manufactured would be formidable in Type III situations. 
C. The Nondiscrimination Standard 
 The second branch of the international law of state responsibility accords to aliens non-
discriminatory treatment in comparison to citizens. In the nuclear export context, this prescrip-
tion would translate into a requirement that E cannot export power plant technology that would 
not meet E's own internal safety standards. Thus, that we have called Type I would be prohibited 
under such a requirement. FN148 From the perspective of international human rights, the strin-
gent nondiscrimination standard is, at least in the abstract, desirable: Why export a less safe 
product than we are willing to accept at home? Unfortunately, because of the nonuniformity of 
domestic standards among exporting nations, the inevitable result of such a standard is to reach 
quickly the lowest common denominator—the exporter with the least stringent safety require-
ments domestically would obtain a competitive advantage over all other exporters. Equally unde-
sirable is the likely domestic impact: nation E might decide, in order to maximize its export po-
tential, to lower its internal safety standards. Unless importing nation R is extremely sophisti-
cated, R is likely to buy from the exporter having the lowest internal safety standards [pg1053] 
because of the lower cost of the technology. The likely result of the enforcement of the nondis-
crimination standard is the perversion of its rationale within the law of state responsibility. 
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 The very lack of uniformity among domestic safety standards of exporters signifies a 
willingness by different populations to tolerate different degrees of safety in return for electric 
power. There is no nonpaternalistic reason why this same diversity of risk-taking should not ap-
ply to importing as well as exporting nations. In the absence of an international regulatory au-
thority that would prescribe uniform standards, the cost/safety tradeoff is a matter for individual 
determination by a nation (with the exception, as we have argued previously, of safety that is 
compromised below the international minimum standard). The question, then, is how to relate 
the law of state responsibility's nondiscrimination principle to this diversity of safety toleration 
among nations. 
 We contend that as to Type I plants, the exporter at minimum has a duty under the princi-
ple of nondiscrimination to make full and effective disclosure to the importer of precisely 
whether, how, and why the exported plant fails to meet domestic licensing standards. If R 
chooses to buy a plant that would not meet E's domestic standards, that choice ought to be avail-
able to R. Once such disclosure is made, and R is fully informed, E's duty is discharged and no 
further liability ought to be attributable to E. 
 The idea of "effective" disclosure warrants brief elucidation. The importer generally, and 
developing-nation importers in particular, cannot be expected to have the same degree of exper-
tise regarding the hazardous nature of nuclear power plants as does the exporter. To that extent, 
there is a range of potential communication problems. One cannot assume, for example, that a 
technical document detailing domestic licensing standards and specifying the deviations from 
those standards reflected in the design of the plant would constitute effective disclosure. Instead, 
the disclosure standard should be analogous to "informed consent" in medicine, where one finds 
a gulf between the expertise of doctor and patient. FN149 Informed consent in that context is 
[pg1054] nevertheless possible if stated in clear and ordinary language and if the risks are as-
signed numerical probabilities. A similar procedure should be applied to nuclear power plant ex-
ports if the exporter wishes to avoid liability for an accident in a Type I situation. 
 The idea of full and effective disclosure comports well with the nondiscrimination princi-
ple of the law of state responsibility. That principle, as we have seen, never required that aliens 
receive all the benefits and incidents of citizenship, but rather that they not be discriminated 
against in fundamental matters affecting their personal rights and freedoms. The issue of safety 
in nuclear power plants involves matters of life and death. Surely one can hardly ask for a more 
fundamental right than the right to live. But like many other incidents of a technological age, the 
real question is one of risks and benefits. Although thousands of human lives are at risk, the risk 
also brings electrical power, which is not only considered a "necessity" of civilization, but also 
saves lives in a very real sense. To increase safety usually means to increase cost. An increase in 
cost is the same as a deprivation of marginal electrical power: a total deprivation to some people 
who are economically at the margin, and a partial deprivation to everyone else. 
 Furthermore, there is a distinction to be drawn between the classic applicability of the 
state responsibility principle of nondiscrimination to aliens suffering a denial of justice, and the 
present case of nuclear power exports. In the classic situation, an alien has no choice. He may 
have been arrested in violation of his rights; he may have been subject to mistreatment in prison; 
he may have been denied a speedy and effective trial. We can hardly say that he "consented" to 
any of these deprivations, unless we use a very attenuated notion of consent to include the alien's 
original decision to be physically present in the country, and in the place and at the time where 
he was in fact arrested. In contrast, R has consented to the importation of the power plant tech-
 20 
 
nology. To be sure, depending upon how "democratic" R is, the people of R may not have indi-
vidually consented to or ratified this importation. FN150 Yet even in a nondemocratic R, the 
people are accepting the benefits of electrical power. Their government [pg1055] was not forced 
to import the nuclear power plant technology. Thus, when we compare the classic case of denial 
of justice to an alien with our current case of nuclear power imports, we find in the latter a larger 
element of consent. 
 Nevertheless, too much should not be made of this distinction. No one has really "con-
sented" to use a product that results in the user's death. And if R is a dictatorship, the people of R 
have not consented to the importation of the power technology in any meaningful sense. FN151 
Even so, international law does not take a deistic or paternalistic view of national choices; to 
second guess nations such as R that import dangerous technology would contradict the generally 
accepted principle of equality among nations. Rather, it is our contention that a reasonable inter-
pretation of the nondiscrimination branch of the law of state responsibility in the present context 
requires E to give full disclosure and R to acknowledge informed consent. 
 At a deeper level, however, the nondiscrimination principle is indeed met by the require-
ment of full disclosure and informed consent. Consider the citizens of E. The safety standards 
that they have accepted internally represent a tradeoff between risk and cost. At some point, they 
decide that a marginal increase in safety is not worth an incremental increase in the cost of elec-
tric power. Knowing what the cost factors and the safety-risk factors are, they reach an accom-
modation that they are willing to live with. All that the nondiscrimination principle requires, in 
our view, is that the same knowledge of the tradeoff between safety-risk and cost be conveyed to 
the purchaser R. If the people of R make a different decision as to where a marginal increase in 
safety is not worth a cost increment, they have the right to make such a different decision. They 
would only be "discriminated against" if the knowledge of the safety and cost factors that were 
available to the people of E were not made available to the people of R or their governmental 
representatives. Hence, the nondiscrimination [pg1056] principle is satisfied if full disclosure is 
made to R as to the factors involved in the tradeoff between safety and cost. 
D. Possible Mitigating Strategies 
 Although liability of the exporting nation, under any of the three types of situations we 
have depicted, should be an extreme rarity, the possibility of enormous liability raises interesting 
tactical questions. For example, can E avoid liability by announcing a free export policy, 
whereby no export license is required? Part of the Commissioner's concern in the Philippine case 
was indeed a fear that official United States scrutiny of the Westinghouse plant might subject the 
United States to liability should an accident occur at the Philippine plant, implying that lessened 
scrutiny might leave the United States in a preferred position. However, because liability may be 
found under the doctrine of state responsibility for nonfeasance as well as for misfeasance, 
FN152 we argue that E is liable irrespective of whether it makes any effort to supervise the 
safety of its exports. E should have prevented the export of extremely hazardous nuclear power 
plant technology even if it in fact did not do so. Certainly international law knows no doctrine to 
the effect that a state is in a better position if it ignores extraterritorial hazards than if it monitors 
them. FN153 
 One likely effect of such a liability scheme raises intriguing and difficult questions. Faced 
with potential liability resulting from the export of Type I and II plants, exporting nations may 
attempt to shift the liability to the designer-manufacturer of the plant or to the importing nation 
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or to both. With respect to the manufacturer, the exporting nation is unlikely to succeed. No de-
sign or manufacturing company would risk bankruptcy in accepting liability for a potentially dis-
astrous meltdown or explosion of one of its plants in a foreign country. No chief executive would 
"bet the company" on a single export, no matter how much profit was assured. Nor is insurance 
for [pg1057] such a disaster available. In the United States, nuclear power plants are uninsured 
(except for a very small amount); even consortiums of insurance and reinsurance companies are 
unwilling to insure such plants. Under the Price-Anderson Act, owner liability is limited; FN154 
the population in the area surrounding the nuclear power plant is, in effect, self-insured. FN155 
A fortiori, no manufacturer or insurance company would accept liability for accidents abroad, 
where the damage awards in an unfamiliar foreign legal system might greatly exceed those in the 
United States. FN156 
 Even if a manufacturer were willing to accept liability, the magnitude of the potential 
damage in the case of a catastrophic accident would mean that R and the people of R would 
hardly begin to be compensated, if all that were available for compensation were the assets of the 
manufacturer. In practice, then, the "deep pocket" is nation E. Since R and the people of R are 
most likely to want recovery from E, E is most likely to ask for a waiver. Thus, before allowing 
the export of the nuclear plant technology to R, E may require that R sign a waiver absolving E 
of any claims that R or the people of R might have against E for any and all of the three types of 
safety problems we have depicted. A well-drafted waiver would guarantee R's consent to the im-
portation of a dangerously defective plant, and a listing of a full range of possible defects would 
accompany the waiver. 
 Prior to 1978, the United States regularly included the following article in all govern-
ment-to-government agreements covering the export of special nuclear material, source material, 
and nuclear facilities [pg1058] under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954: FN157 
 The application or use of any information (including design drawings and specifications) 
and any material, equipment and devices, exchanged or transferred between the Parties under 
this Agreement or the superseded Agreement shall be the responsibility of the Party receiving it, 
and the other Party does not warrant the accuracy or completeness of such information and does 
not warrant the suitability of such information, material, equipment and devices for any particu-
lar use of application.FN158 
 This warranty disclaimer, which may not be as legally protective of the exporter as would 
be an explicit waiver of liability, was nevertheless discontinued by the United States after 1978 
on the grounds that it was no longer considered appropriate for inclusion in a government-to-
government agreement after the passage of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. FN159 
 The international-law question is whether, where E requires R to sign an agreement con-
taining a warranty disclaimer or a waiver of liability, such an attempt to shift liability would be 
binding on the people of R. A conceivable scenario is the following: E specifies that the Type I 
plant it plans to ship to R (at low cost) would never meet E's own internal safety standards. Or E 
specifies that the Type II plant it plans to export to R (at low cost) is inherently dangerous and 
unsuitable for R. E adds, however, that if R wants the plant anyway, it can give its written con-
sent to being held fully liable and to indemnify E against any and all claims, including claims 
presented by R or the people of R. And in the Type III case, E asks that R waive any [pg1059] 
and all claims resulting from negligence in the manufacture of the plant and to hold E harmless 
against any such claims. 
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 Should international law respect such a waiver? In most areas of law, indemnification 
agreements and waivers of liability are favored under the principle of general freedom of con-
tract. Sometimes, however, such agreements are void as a matter of the public policy to do sub-
stantial justice, especially in the case of torts resulting in serious injuries. FN160 Although there 
is no "public policy" argument in international law, there is a related principle of jus cogens, 
which renders void certain provisions in treaties (an easy example being a treaty providing for 
slave trade). FN161 With respect to the international minimum standard, we are dealing with a 
fundamental denial of justice which, analogizing to the jus cogens principle, is not waivable or 
transferable to another party. When applied to nuclear exports, it follows that, as a general rule, 
an exporting nation should not be allowed to transfer liability for the plant's dangerous defects to 
the importing nation. 
 Consider a plant that is clearly unsafe in its design such that a major accident can rea-
sonably be anticipated to occur. That R wants to buy such a plant and is willing to accept all li-
ability is not a sufficient reason for E to sell it. International law is no different from domestic 
law in this respect: a foreseeable major accident should not be made more probable because one 
party to a transaction is able to use a legal form (e.g., a waiver agreement) that ostensibly insu-
lates it from any responsibility for the accident. Indeed, the pervasiveness of such a principle in 
domestic legal systems is a good argument for lifting it into international law as a "general prin-
ciple of law." FN162 
  [pg1060] Over and above the interest in preventing such large-scale catastrophes, how-
ever, is the very real possibility that the consent of the leaders of R to the transaction does not 
represent the consent of the people of R—the ones most vulnerable in the case of a large-scale 
accident. The ultimate victims of a nuclear power plant catastrophe are the people of an import-
ing nation, not its government. FN163 Consequently, our concern should be with the protection 
of their human right to determine the risks they are willing to withstand. 
 It may well be argued that the population of R will always be worse off if waiver is per-
mitted, regardless of whether the choice to waive liability is theirs or that of an uncaring leader. 
In countries where the defense of sovereign immunity does not exist, the population may have a 
claim against its own government. In those countries, from the population's viewpoint, there is 
no "consideration" to shift liability from E to R, since R is already fully liable. Even if "consid-
eration" takes the form of a lower price to R in return for exoneration of E, the population would 
be made worse off rather than better off by any such "consideration," because its practical effect 
would be to encourage (by the reduction in price) the importation of the unsafe nuclear power 
plant. Hence the "consideration" would be less than worthless as far as the population is con-
cerned, since they would be better off not receiving the plant at all. 
 The situation will be the same in the many developing countries where governments are 
shielded from the claims of their citizens by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Here exonera-
tion of E arguably means that R has self-insured against the risk of accident. The argument 
would be that if the government of R waives a claim against E, the people of R are no worse off. 
However, as a practical matter, the people are still worse off. In the event of a major accident, R 
would not be able to sue E for damages because of the waiver agreement. Yet the catastrophe 
may be such that R has no funds to help the irradiated and injured populace. Hence, here too 




  [pg1061] Obtaining informed consent from the population of R to the waiver is one way 
out of the dilemma. But in what sense could the population itself consent to a substandard nu-
clear power plant? It is impractical in the extreme to expect a population to give informed con-
sent to an issue as complex as the safety of a new nuclear power plant. Even a literate population 
of a democratic country could hardly be expected to give informed consent, let alone the popula-
tions of developing countries. Thus we must inquire whether the government is the organ that 
properly should give consent on behalf of the population. Normally it is assumed that a govern-
ment represents its people. Yet this assumption is challenged by situations such as that of Presi-
dent Marcos of the Philippines, whose primary motive in acquiring the Westinghouse plant was 
the prestige associated with nuclear power. FN164 To be sure, some would argue that Marcos, 
by definition, was acting on behalf of his population, since he was, for better or worse, the leader 
of their government. But this argument, a vestige of "realpolitik" and mutual-security alliances, 
is crumbling today in the light of human-rights concerns and a more realistic view of popular 
sovereignty. FN165 
 But the question of informed consent runs deeper than the mere issue of whether a gov-
ernment truly speaks for its population. Consider a tourist who is warned not to travel to a certain 
country because its police are corrupt and might "kidnap" the tourist, threatening to throw him in 
jail unless he comes up with bribe money. Does a tourist who nevertheless travels to such a 
country legally assume the risk of such illegal police behavior? Under the international minimum 
standard of state responsibility, the tourist certainly does not. That standard would never have 
evolved if it were held that aliens assumed the risk of known corruption or illegality among the 
police or bureaucracy of the host country. Instead, irrespective of the tourist's knowledge or im-
plied actual consent (actual consent was often obtained by the police under threat of torture), the 
tourist has always retained an international law cause of action against the host government un-
der the international minimum standard of state responsibility. Analogously, with respect to 
popular consent through a [pg1062] government to the importation of an unsafe nuclear power 
plant, the consent should not be held to absolve the exporter of liability to the population of the 
receiving government. 
 This result accords interestingly with the strategy developed in the nineteenth century un-
der the "Calvo doctrine" in the field of state responsibility. The host country would typically in-
sert a clause into its governmental contracts with foreigners that the foreigner explicitly waived 
any diplomatic protection and chose to litigate any contractual disputes solely in the host coun-
try's courts. FN166 Suppose an American dredging company signed such a contract prior to 
commencing work for the Mexican government and later chose to litigate a contract dispute not 
in Mexican courts, but in an American court or in the court of a bilateral claims commission. 
While in such cases the waiver was held inoperative, it was on the ground that the company 
lacked standing to waive a right of its own government. Diplomatic protection is a right of the 
United States, not the company, and hence may be asserted irrespective of the company's waiver. 
 As applied to the nuclear power plant situation, the Calvo doctrine would protect the 
population of R. Even though the government of R may sign a waiver exonerating E from liabil-
ity, R lacks standing to waive the international human-rights claims of its own population. The 
international law of human rights transcends any bilateral law under which E and R execute a 
waiver, just as in the Calvo experience the international law of state responsibility transcended 
any waiver executed between Mexico and the dredging company. In the Type I and Type II 
situations—exceedingly rare though they may be—the exporting nation is liable to the people 
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suffering the damage. The exporter is the injurer; the people are the injured; and nothing either 
the exporting or importing governments may decide between themselves should change this in-
ternational law result. 
 
V. UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF NUCLEAR POWER TECHNOLOGY EXPORTATION 
 We would have to be particularly morbid to write an article directed solely to the ques-
tion of liability following a catastrophic nuclear power plant accident. Our purpose is to help 
prevent such accidents. In that respect our purpose coincides with that of tort law [pg1063] in 
general. As Judge Posner has shown, the primary purpose of the law of torts is deterrence; only 
second is the provision of compensation. FN167 
 The application of the two pillars of the doctrine of state responsibility—the international 
minimum standard and the nondiscrimination standard—to the exportation of nuclear power 
plant technology provides only a very low "floor" and a very high "ceiling." On the one hand, 
although the minimum standard principle disallows exportation of nuclear technology below that 
of the minimum standard, it is a very low standard and hardly provides adequate protection. On 
the other hand, although the nondiscrimination principle's full disclosure rule will in many cases 
be adequate, often it simply will not apply to a nation's exports. In the case of an exporting state 
which has no domestic nuclear power regulations, its exports will not be impeded by a full dis-
closure requirement, because there will be practically nothing to disclose. Likewise, as indicated 
above, there are many situations in which "effective" disclosure is not possible. FN168 Disclo-
sure and its effectiveness will vary with the participatory character of a given nation's govern-
ment, as well as with its accountability, domestically and internationally. 
 Even in situations in which the duty of full disclosure will apply, market mechanisms 
may significantly detract from its effectiveness in ensuring the safety of nuclear power exports 
for two reasons. First, the nuclear power market's highly competitive and decentralized nature 
could trigger a "race to the bottom"—an economic phenomenon wherein nations attempt to cap-
ture the greatest market share by adopting the lowest and most permissive domestic standards 
practicable. So long as a decentralized market exists, profit-maximizing nations can be expected 
to engage in opportunistic pursuits of the limited number of nuclear power contracts available. 
Second, the decentralized nature of the market allows for the overlapping of the provision of 
technology from various exporting nations. Thus, even [pg1064] where the full disclosure rule 
applies, its usefulness in assessing the overall safety of the plant will be severely undercut. 
 We believe that an international regulatory authority, in addition to international tort law, 
is needed to adequately address the problem of unsafe nuclear technology. FN169 Such an au-
thority could devise uniform disclosure rules for regulating nuclear power plant exports to sup-
plement the exporter's duty of full disclosure. First, such uniform rules would make it easier for 
the receiving countries to compare competing technologies. Second, raising the safety standards 
would be consonant with competition in a free world market. Every nation would compete on the 
basis of the same safety standards, so that competition would not take the form of skimping on 
safety features. Rather, competition would be based, as it should be, on price, design, perform-
ance, and service. Third, any "race to the bottom," to the disadvantage of the citizenry in the ex-
porting nations, would be eliminated. Most importantly, the international regulatory authority 
could develop uniform standards that are above the international minimum standard. 
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 Not all aspects of nuclear power exportation, however, are susceptible to international 
regulation, even where safety concerns may be relevant. Because the design, construction and 
even operation of nuclear power plants are often unique to certain nations, the safety aspects of 
nuclear power exportation should be spread out along a continuum, ranging from those most sus-
ceptible to international regulation to those least susceptible. The former consist of those aspects 
of nuclear power production that could easily be made uniform among all nuclear exporting and 
importing states. Illustrations of these are plant siting and plant radiation emission levels. As 
demonstrated by the Philippine nuclear plant, a plant's distance from an active volcano and popu-
lation centers is a major safety concern. FN170 Uniform international standards could be devised 
to govern the minimum allowable distance between a nuclear plant and a volcano or town, 
thereby substantially reducing the risk that a nuclear accident [pg1065] could be caused by vol-
canic action or that population centers would be subjected to close-in radioactive fallout. Along 
with site specifications, the daily maximum amount of radiation a plant could emit on a periodic 
basis could be regulated internationally. Once a safe ambient level was determined, the plant's 
designers and operators would be responsible for ensuring that the plant's emissions, minus the 
natural atmospheric radiation levels, did not exceed that level. 
 Slightly less susceptible to international regulation, but nevertheless capable of comply-
ing with worldwide safety standards, would be the installation of certain coherent plant safety 
systems. These may include fire protection equipment or a "scram" or shut-down system that 
turns the plant off automatically in the event of an operating failure. FN171 Although these and 
similar systems would vary with the plant's size and design, they are unrelated to the plant's ac-
tual production of electricity. Therefore, requiring that each plant include them and that they 
measure up to certain operating standards could, to a certain extent, be imposed on an interna-
tional scale. 
 At the other end of the spectrum, there are certain aspects of the safe production of nu-
clear power which are not at present technologically susceptible to international regulation. 
These are safety concerns that are controlled by unique features of the plant such as the actual 
design of the reactor or its steam generator. Equally immune to international regulation are safety 
risks consequent to the interface of technology from several different sources in one plant. Sub-
contracting for the construction or design of facilities outside the nuclear steam supply system or 
the "balance of plant" such as the containment structure or auxiliary buildings is a common prac-
tice among cost-avoiding developing nations. FN172 According to one nuclear engineer, this in-
troduces not only "obvious interface problems including the use of varying design criteria and 
safety requirements, but also may result in the use of components and systems that differ materi-
ally from those being constructed or in operation and reviewed in the country of origin." FN173 
Although international standards may be powerless to regulate the safety aspects of the plant's 
unique design, and must be controlled through the exporter's duty of full disclosure, [pg1066] 
international regulations can prescribe certain procedures to minimize the risks inherent in a 
plant built with the technology of many different nations. These may simply require good-faith 
joint consultations between the different national subcontractors and the necessity that each re-
view the others' plans and incorporate the others' design as much as possible. 
 The existence of barriers to uniform regulation of the "balance of plant" considerations il-
lustrates that international regulation cannot resolve all of the potential safety problems of an ex-
ported nuclear power plant. Nevertheless, this does not detract from the very real benefits of in-
ternational regulation of those aspects of a plant's design and construction that are susceptible to 
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uniform regulations. International regulation is capable of promoting marketable plants that in-
clude safety features, as well as preventing nuclear power exports from falling to the very low 
level of the minimum international standards of treatment. 
 Neither the international law of state responsibility nor an international regulatory author-
ity should be viewed as a replacement for each other. Both have roles to play. As legal research-
ers, we naturally have emphasized the doctrinal analysis, which in principle is independent of the 
existence of an international regulatory authority. But if we were lobbyists for a safer world, we 
would be advocating a constitutive treaty to set up an international nuclear regulatory authority 
with plenary and mandatory power to set uniform safety standards for the export of all technol-
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FN1 The nuclear power reactors exported to the developing nations often contain po-
tentially serious safety defects. Most of these reactors would not pass the safety review carried 
out by the exporting nation on its own domestic reactors. The nuclear export business of the 
American company, Westinghouse, provides many examples. For instance, the reactor exported 
to Brazil by Westinghouse Corporation encountered so many operating difficulties that Brazil 
stopped payments on the reactor in May 1982. Export-Import Bank Programs and Policies: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Fin. and Monetary Policy of the Sen. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 374 (1982) (statement of Virginia Foote, Asso-
ciate Director, Center for Development Policy). Westinghouse nuclear reactors of the Brazilian 
design exported to Spain, Sweden, and Yugoslavia have reported the same problems that plagued 
the Brazilian reactors. Id. The Westinghouse reactor exported to the Philippines, discussed in de-
tail infra, is referenced to the Brazilian reactor. Id. at 375. It too has encountered safety problems 
and could not be built in the United States as it does not include all post-1973 requirements for 
reactor safety. Id. at 376. Yet another Westinghouse plant exported to South Korea has had diffi-
culties caused by disorders in its secondary cooling system. However, these problems may be 
due to the work of South Korean workers and not the exporters. Id. The presence of safety de-
fects in nuclear plants exported by other nations is suggested in several essays included in Nu-
clear Power in Developing Countries: An Analysis of Decision Making (J. Katz & O. Marwah 
eds. 1982) [hereinafter Katz & Marwah]. For example safety concerns, together with cost con-
siderations caused the People's Republic of China to suspend a contract to import nuclear power 
technology from France in the Spring of 1979. The nature of China's safety concerns is not speci-
fied, however. Id. at 129. In 1977, the Baroda nuclear power plant in India experienced a major 
accident and was subsequently shutdown. This plant was built with foreign technology and the 
plant failure was attributed to poor design standards and problems associated with the quality of 
metal at the plant. Id. at 173. 
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FN2 See Notice of Application to N.R.C. for Licenses to Export Nuclear Facilities or 
Materials, 53 Fed. Reg. 16,800 (1988). 
FN3 Robert Quentin-Baxter, former special rapporteur for a special study of the In-
ternational Law Commission, reported that it was suggested to the Commission that the state of 
which a multinational corporation is a national should be liable when it exports dangerous indus-
tries to developing states and harm results. International Liability for Injurious Consequences 
Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law: Third Report by Mr. Robert Q. Quen-
tin-Baxter, Special Rapporteur at 20, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/360 (1982) reprinted in [1982] 2 Y.B. 
Int'l L. Comm'n at 60-61, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/Add.1 (Part 1) [hereinafter Quentin-
Baxter's Third Report]. This is the essence of the thesis we advance. Quentin-Baxter, writing on 
behalf of the Commission, rejected the imposition of such liability, however. Rather, the Com-
mission's study is limited to "activities and situations which are within the territory or control of 
a State, and which give or may give rise to a physical consequence affecting the use or enjoy-
ment of areas within the territory or control of any other State." International Liability for Injuri-
ous Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law: Fifth Report by Mr. 
Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter, Special Rapporteur at 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/383 (1984), reprinted in 
[1984] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 155, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1984/Add.1 (Part 1) [hereinafter 
Quentin-Baxter's Fifth Report]. This limitation has been supported by one commentator. See 
Magraw, The International Law Commission's Study of International Liability for Nonprohibited 
Acts as it Relates to Developing States, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 1041, 1057-58 (1986). 
That the exporting nation may have liability under international law to the population 
of the importing nation has not been advanced by any other commentator in the field. See, e.g., 
Handl, An International Legal Perspective on the Conduct of Abnormally Dangerous Activities 
in Frontier Areas: The Case of Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 7 Ecology L.Q. 1 (1978) (placement 
of hazardous activities where there could be transboundary effects may violate international 
law); Jenks, Liability for Ultra-Hazardous Activities in International Law, 117 Recueil des Cours 
99 (1966-I) (discusses international conventions which place liability for nuclear damage on the 
operators of a nuclear installation); State Responsibility and Liability for Injurious Consequences 
Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 16 Netherlands Y.B. Int'l L. 1 (1985) 
(series of articles concerning liability of states for injurious consequences). 
FN4 Quentin-Baxter's Fifth Report, supra note 3, at 155-56; Handl, supra note 3, at 
3; Jenks, supra note 3, at 145. 
FN5 This is the position taken by the International Law Commission and one com-
mentator on the Commission's study of international liability for nonprohibited acts. In limiting 
the proposed liability scheme to physical transboundary harm and thereby excluding liability for 
hazardous exports, Quentin-Baxter argued that states remain "primarily accountable" for activi-
ties occurring within their own territories, Quentin-Baxter's Third Report, supra note 3, at 48; see 
also Magraw, supra note 3, at 1046. 
Often the government of the nation where the accident occurs retains broad sovereign 
immunity and the nation's legal system does not have an advanced tort doctrine, thus making 
such suits difficult. In India, at least, in addition to an absence of an advanced tort doctrine in the 
nation's legal system, the government's retention of broad sovereign immunity would apparently 
bar litigation against the Indian government for regulatory failures possibly contributing to the 
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leak of toxic gases in the Bhopal disaster at Union Carbide. See Galanter, Legal Torpor: Why So 
Little Has Happened in India After the Bhopal Tragedy, 20 Tex. Int'l L.J. 273, 275-77 (1985). 
FN6 For a full description of the catastrophe—what is known about why it occurred 
and the damage it caused—see Malone, The Chernobyl Accident: A Case Study in International 
Law Regulating State Responsibility for Transboundary Nuclear Pollution, 12 Colum. J. Envtl. 
L. 203 (1987). Of course, Professor Malone's discussion of state responsibility is in the context 
of the potential liability of the Soviet Union for fallout extending beyond its boundaries. The 
Chernobyl plant was not itself exported; hence it is not an instance of the subject matter of the 
present Article. Nevertheless, it is instructive to note that the Chernobyl accident occurred de-
spite the existence of safety features found on American reactors. N.Y. Times, May 25, 1986, § 
4, at 1, col. 1. James K. Asselstine, one of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) 
five present commissioners stated that "[a]s with the Soviet reactor, our reactors are not designed 
to contain large core melt accidents." Id. The NRC predicts that the "probability of a meltdown 
in an American reactor in the next 20 years is nearly 50 percent and that some meltdowns could 
release even more radiation than at Chernobyl." Id. This is significant, considering the generally 
poorer quality nuclear power plants that are exported from nations such as the United States to 
developing nations. 
Although the Chernobyl accident has been a major set-back to the nuclear industry 
(KWU in West Germany, one of the world's biggest nuclear-plant builders, has yet to sell a new 
nuclear plant since 1982), nuclear power plant industry officials plan a comeback starting with 
efforts to prevent additional accidents. Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 1987, at 28, col. 1. 
FN7 N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1986, at D13, col. 1. The Bhopal accident illustrates the 
dangers posed by exporting dangerous technology to developing nations. Reports indicate that a 
host of safety standard violations accompanied the Bhopal accident. The gas leak began two 
hours after a worker, whose training did not meet the plant's official standards, was told by a su-
perior to wash out an unsealed pipe, a procedure prohibited by the plant's safety standards. N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 28, 1985, at A1, col. 1. Although allegedly built to specifications, two of the plant's 
three safety systems did not react properly to prevent the accident. Id. Furthermore, investigation 
revealed that the accident could have been averted had a spare tank been empty to receive the 
overflow of the gas eventually leaked, methyl isocynate, as required by plant safety standards. Id. 
at A6, col. 1. Since what instruments the plant had were not in working order, the workers were 
not alerted to the leak or its seriousness early enough to avert the accident. Id. For the early 
stages of the judicial battle over this incident, see In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster 
at Bhopal, India, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (granting Union Carbide's motion for dis-
missal on forum non conveniens grounds), aff'd, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987). 
FN8 International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Power Reactors in the World, 20-
43 (1987 ed.) (tables 11, 12, and 14). As of December, 1986, the United States led the world in 
nuclear power plant exports to developing nations. The United States had exported, or planned to 
export, fourteen nuclear power plants to six developing nations: six to Taiwan, two each to India, 
Mexico and South Korea, and one each to Yugoslavia and Brazil. Id. Construction of a fifteenth 
reactor, exported by the United States to the Philippines, see text accompanying notes 23-72, was 
suspended in 1986. Id. The Soviet Union was the second largest nuclear power exporter, with 
thirteen exports to four developing nations: five to Bulgaria, four to Hungary, and two each to 
Czechoslovakia and Cuba. Id. Canada was next with two exports to India, four to Romania, and 
one each to Argentina, South Korea, and Pakistan. Id. Finally, two reactors exported from France 
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were under construction in South Korea, and two more French reactors were planned for con-
struction in China. Id. In addition to these exports, three developing nations have built, or were in 
the process of building their own nuclear power plants—India (ten plants), Czechoslovakia (nine 
plants), and China (one plant). Id. The extent to which foreign technology will be used in these 
ventures is not clear.  
This high number of exports may be largely attributed to a slack in the domestic de-
mand for nuclear power reactors within developing nations. See Katz & Marwah, supra note 1, at 
112-13 (absence of dramatic growth in domestic demand has rendered West Germany's Kraft-
werk Union dependent on export sales, especially those to Brazil); Id. at 232 (due to the decrease 
in domestic demand, Framatome of France and the United States firms of Babcock and Wilcox, 
Combustion Engineering, General Electric, and Westinghouse engaged in aggressive competi-
tion to gain contracts to export nuclear power reactors to South Korea). 
FN9 "Sales of nuclear equipment are becoming government-to-government deals in 
which price matters less than political promises." Nuclear Exports: Four Down, Few to Go, The 
Economist, Nov. 19, 1977, at 100, 103. For example, Germany's nuclear power plant exporter, 
the Siemens subsidiary Kraftwerk Union, succeeded in obtaining a nuclear power plant order 
from Brazil by promising to transfer a "whole package of (sensitive) nuclear technology." Id. 
FN10 See, e.g., Handl, supra note 3, at 39-42. 
FN11 See Magraw, supra note 3, at 1050. Although the International Law Commis-
sion argued these problems affected developing states' ability to control polluting activities 
within their boundaries or across their borders, they apply equally to a developing state's import 
of hazardous technology. 
FN12 See, e.g., Rosen, The Critical Issue of Nuclear Power Plant Safety in Develop-
ing Countries, 19 Int'l Atom. Energy Agency Bull. 12 (1977). Rosen writes that:  
At the present time, with little exception, the regulatory organizations of developing countries 
with active nuclear programmes can be classified as sub-minimal. In many cases they consist of less than 
15 full-time staff members associated with nuclear power activities. This minimal staff may not be familiar 
with the disciplines of nuclear safety and may be in need of extensive training. Id. at 18. 
A recent article suggests that little has changed in the ten years since Rosen made this 
claim. The International Atomic Energy Bulletin states that "[i]n providing assistance to develop-
ing Member States, the Agency has found that adequate infrastructures were often lacking that 
would ensure a smooth and successful introduction of nuclear power in developing countries." 
Csik & Schenk, Nuclear Power in Developing Countries: Requirements & Constraints, 29 Int'l 
Atom. Energy Agency Bull. 39 (1987). The article cited manpower and financing as the most 
critical problems facing developing countries seeking to start up nuclear power programs. Id. at 
40. See generally Katz & Marwah, supra note 1, at 107-08 (Brazil); id. at 139 (Egypt); id. at 253 
(Mexico); id. at 287 (Philippines); id. at 302 (Republic of China); id. at 315 (Turkey); id. at 332 
(Venezuela).  
FN13 Rosen, supra note 12, at 15. Nor do the exporting nations normally take into 
account such factors as the dissimilarity of the construction site in the receiving nation (for ex-
ample, is it near a volcano?) and the admixture of parts from other supplier nations (containment 
structures, fuel handling systems, steam conversion systems, and rad-waste systems) that typi-
cally become integrated into the eventual construction of the plants. Id. at 15-17. Six nuclear ex-
porters (the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United 
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States, and Sweden) have licensing mechanisms. But they require only a showing that the plant 
intended for export is roughly similar to a plant that is constructed domestically by the same 
manufacturer and which at one time complied with domestic safety standards.  
FN14 In 1980, for example, the NRC partially grounded its plurality decision to grant 
a license to Westinghouse Corporation for the export of a nuclear power plant to the Philippines 
on a Filipino government communication that it would regard even a detailed health and safety 
review of the new reactor as an intrusion upon its sovereignty. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 
11 N.R.C. 631, 638 (1980) ("In the present proceeding, the Government of the Philippines has 
made it clear that a detailed health and safety review of the Napot Point Reactor conducted by 
agencies of the U.S. Government as part of the export licensing process, would be regarded as an 
intrusion into its sovereign responsibilities."). 
FN15 See infra text accompanying notes 23-72. 
FN16 See infra text accompanying notes 63-72. 
FN17 See infra text accompanying notes 73-144. 
FN18 See infra text accompanying notes 94-102. 
FN19 See F. Kratochwil, H. Mahajan & P. Rohrlich, Peace and Disputed Sover-
eignty: Reflections on Conflict over Territory (1985). 
FN20 See infra text accompanying notes 119-44. 
FN21 See infra text accompanying notes 145-66. 
FN22 See infra text accompanying notes 167-73. 
FN23 NRDC v. NRC, 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
FN24 In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 11 N.R.C. 631, 631 (1980). 
FN25 NRDC, 647 F.2d at 1345. 
FN26 See Scherr, Philippines, in Nuclear Power In Developing Countries: An Analy-
sis of Decision Making 273, 279 (J. Katz and O. Marwah eds. 1982). Sister Aida Velasquez' ef-
forts to obtain information about the plant and to hold public meetings to discuss the plant were 
impeded by the government of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos. Eventually Sister 
Velasquez was forced to seek the support of environmental organizations in the United States 
and other countries. Id. 
FN27 Id. 
FN28 Id. 
FN29 Id. Marcos refused to accept the safety assurances of his own National Power 
Corporation (NPC) (an entity solely responsible for all new electricity generation in the Philip-
pines after Marcos nationalized all electric power facilities) and demanded that Westinghouse 
send representatives to Manila to make written safety commitments to him personally. Id. This 
incident was atypical in that in June 1979 public controversy forced Marcos to halt construction 
of the plant pending a review of the plant by a presidential commission. Id. at 285. In November 
of that same year criticism led Marcos to suspend the construction of the plant unless Westing-
house renegotiated the contract. Id. at 287. Although the contract was renegotiated in September 
1980, to incorporate some 33 safety improvements, Id. at 289, according to a Union of Con-
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cerned Scientists' engineer, "the renegotiated contract contains no provisions that would lead to 
the resolution of even a single unresolved safety issue." Letter from Robert D. Pollard to Presi-
dent Ferdinand E. Marcos (September 21, 1984) [hereinafter Pollard Letter] (updated safety re-
port on the Bataan nuclear power plant) (copy on file with the Virginia Law Review). 
FN30 Press reports stated that a close friend of Marcos, Herminio Disini, had been 
paid a $50 million commission by Westinghouse for assistance in obtaining the contract from the 
Philippine government. N.Y. Times, March 7, 1986, at A1, col. 4. 
FN31 Id.; N.Y. Times, May 25, 1986, § 1, at 16, col. 1. 
FN32 See Pollard Letter, supra note 29, at 2-5. 
FN33 Scherr, supra note 26, at 280-81. 
FN34 Id. at 280. This request may have been a signal that the Philippines was not re-
ceiving the type of safety information it needed from Westinghouse. An official from the U.S. 
Atomic Energy Agency (AEC), predecessor to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, pointed out 
in the early 1970's that as to nuclear reactors,  
U.S. manufacturers have extremely poor records of information disclosure to foreign purchas-
ers; they term many items as proprietary which are readily made available to the U.S. AEC. Designs at 
times do not reflect all the regulatory items required in the U.S.; at times design innovations are first tried 
by U.S. manufacturers in overseas reactors.  Id. 
FN35 Id. 
FN36 Id. at 284. 
FN37 Id. 
FN38 Id. 
FN39 See id. at 281; Rosen, supra note 12, at 15. In an earlier informal NRC staff re-
view, the Philippines plant was referenced to a Westinghouse plant under construction in Yugo-
slavia since 1974. This plant in turn had been referenced to a plant under construction in Brazil, 
which itself had been referenced to a Puerto Rican plant. The latter, ironically, had been can-
celled because of seismologic problems before the NRC was able to complete a review of its de-
sign. See Scherr, supra note 26, at 281. 
FN40 The Union of Concerned Scientists complained that the Philippines plant suf-
fered from several design problems typical of Westinghouse plants: a faulty core-cooling system, 
a lack of fire protection features, and a lack of operation reliability of safety equipment in gen-
eral (especially a method of stemming a major accident by the rupture of a single generator 
tube). Polard Letter, supra note 29, at 4-5. 
FN41 See id. at 4 (Philippine Atomic Energy Agency's "inaccurate description of the 
relatively simple features intended to protect the reactor against high pressure raised concerns 
that more complex aspects of the design may not be fully understood"). 
FN42 See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 11 N.R.C. 631, 633 (1980). Petitioners 
specifically requested a hearing on seven issues: (1) the nature and magnitude of seismic and 
geological risks posed by the site; (2) the reactor design's seismic adequacy; (3) the reactor's en-
vironmental impact, including the disposition of spent fuel; (4) health and safety dangers to Phil-
ippine citizens; (5) health and safety dangers to U.S. citizens residing in the Philippines; (6) risks 
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to the operation of U.S. military installations in the Philippines; and (7) generic safety questions 
posed by nuclear power plants generally, and by Westinghouse designs in particular. Id. 
FN43 See In re Babcock & Wilcox, 5 N.R.C. 1332 (1977) (no jurisdiction to consider 
the foreign health and safety effects of exports to West Germany); Westinghouse, 3 N.R.C. at 
739 (no jurisdiction to consider the foreign health and safety effects of export to Spain); In re 
Edlow Int'l Co., 3 N.R.C. 563 (1976) (no jurisdiction to consider the foreign health and safety 
effects of exports to India).  
FN44 Westinghouse, 11 N.R.C. at 631. 
FN45 Id. at 637. 
FN46 Id. at 647. 
FN47 Id. at 638. The Board cited Edlow Int'l, a decision to allow the export of ura-
nium fuel to India, in which the NRC stated that it would be "extraordinary" as a matter of inter-
national law, for the NRC to claim jurisdiction to regulate an area clearly within the domestic 
purview of India's regulatory responsibilities. Id. at 639 (citing Edlow Int'l, 3 N.R.C. at 582). The 
Board reached a similar conclusion in the Babcock case in which the Board sanctioned the export 
of nuclear reactor components to West Germany. There the petitioners based their claim on pre-
vious U.S. court decisions requiring U.S. governmental agencies to prepare impact studies on 
projects carried out within the territory of foreign nations. The Board in the Babcock case distin-
guished the court decisions cited by petitioners as simply requiring a U.S. agency review of for-
eign impacts only when the project has substantial domestic effects. Unlike these cases, the 
Board in Babcock claimed a complete assessment of a nuclear export's impact, because it would 
concern solely foreign effects, would necessarily be an intrusion upon a foreign nation's sover-
eignty. Babcock, 5 N.R.C. at 1343-46. Thus the Board in Babcock refused, as it had in Edlow 
Int'l, to grant the petitioner's requests to review the foreign health and safety impacts on the 
German exports. Id. at 1346. 
FN48 Westinghouse, 11 N.R.C. at 648-49. 
FN49 Id. at 648. 
FN50 Id. 
FN51 Id. 
FN52 "Thus, a design review," the Board explained, "would require the N.R.C. to ex-
amine the interface of U.S. supplied equipment with systems and components produced in the 
recipient nation or procured from third-country suppliers." Id. 
FN53 Id. 
FN54 Id. 
FN55 Id. at 649. The Board advocated international cooperative efforts as the best 
means to ensure the safety of the people of the recipient nation. Id. 
FN56 Id. at 666 (Bradford, Comm'r, dissenting). 
FN57 Id. at 667-68. 
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FN58 Id. at 668-69. Bradford wrote, "The finding that the export is not inimical to the 
common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public should rest at least on as 
detailed a review as can reasonably be made. No such review exists." Id. at 669. 
FN59 Id. at 668. 
FN60 Id. 
FN61 Id. 
FN62 Brief for Petitioners at 25, NRDC v. NRC, 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(No. 80-1477). 
FN63 The petitioners contended that jurisdiction to make such a review was provided 
to the NRC by the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. Id. 
FN64 Id. at 44. 
FN65 Id. at 47-48. 
FN66 Id. See NNPA, Publ. L. 95-242, 92 Stat. 120 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 22 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
FN67 NRDC, 647 F.2d at 1368. 
FN68 Id. at 1368. 
FN69 The Republic stated that although it welcomed technical and advisory assis-
tance from the U.S. and international organizations, the international legal principle of comity of 
nations prevented any other nation from purporting to "substitute its judgment of the health, 
safety, and environmental implications of the [Napot Point nuclear plant] for the Republic's 
own." Brief Amicus Curiae of the Republic of the Philippines at 20, NRDC (No. 80-1477). The 
Republic further asserted that Philippine law provided for the creation of numerous agencies 
staffed with skilled professionals who are charged with the responsibility of assessing the health, 
safety and environmental impacts of a nuclear power plant. 
FN70 NRDC, 647 F.2d at 1357-58. 
FN71 Id. at 1359-61. Before discussing the legality of the Board decision to review 
the Philippine nuclear power export under applicable U.S. statutes, the court discussed the effect 
of the review proposed by the petitioners upon the foreign relations of the U.S. The court deter-
mined that such a review would impede the foreign policy objective underlying the Atomic En-
ergy Act, that of promoting nonproliferation policies by selling as much nuclear equipment and 
facilities to foreign nations as is needed, and thereby attaching nonproliferation conditions to the 
contracts of sale. Id. at 1360 (purpose of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) to "'enhance our 
position as a reliable supplier of nuclear fuel to nations which share our antiproliferation poli-
cies,'" quoting 123 Cong. Rec. H9831 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1977) (statement of Rep. Bingham), 
reprinted in Cong. Rec. Serv. Legislative History of NNPA at 873-74.) The court found that "in-
viting an administrative review likely to trench on foreign sensibilities," such as the proposed 
foreign health and safety review, "could thwart the overall purpose" of the NNPA. Id. at 1361. 




FN73 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 711 
(1986) [hereinafter Restatement]. 
FN74 It is possible that the authors of the Restatement did not advert to the question 
we raise in the text whether all the provisions of § 711 apply only to matters that occur within the 
territory of the state that may be held responsible. In comment (c) the authors seem to be talking 
about aliens admitted into residence or illegal aliens present in the territory. On the other hand, 
where violations of human rights are concerned, the Restatement explicitly extends state respon-
sibility extraterritorially to nationals of foreign states. Id. 
In any event, we do not attempt to hold the Restatement to a rule that must be given 
extraterritorial effect; we simply note that the Restatement does not rule out extraterritoriality in 
§ 711. In the following discussion we give reasons why a territorial limitation does not comport 
with the logic of the rule of state responsibility itself. 
FN75 E. Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, § 133, at 350 
(1915); A. Freeman, The International Responsibility of States for Denial of Justice 124-25 
(1938). 
FN76 In this respect, even if the nonnational is accorded treatment consistent with the 
first principle (the international minimum standard), he may still be entitled to a higher standard 
of treatment if he can show that he would have been accorded such a higher standard had he been 
a citizen. See Restatement, supra note 73, § 711 comment f ("Discrimination against aliens in 
matters that are not themselves human rights may nonetheless constitute a denial to the individ-
ual of the equal protection of the laws."); Harvard Univ. Law School Research in Int'l Law, The 
Law of Responsibility of States for Damage Done in Their Territory to the Person or Property of 
Foreigners, Art. 5-8 (Tent. Draft No. 2 1929) (relating to the nondiscrimination principle in the 
alien's access to and treatment by the judiciary). 
FN77 See, e.g., France (Fabiani) v. Venezuela, 5 Moore Arb. 4877 (1903) (failure of 
court to render a decision); Jones, 4 Moore Digest of Int'l Arb. 3253 (1898) (excessive bail); 
Coles and Croswell, 78 Brit. & For. State Papers 1301 (1885) (unfair trial); Idler v. Venezuela, 4 
Moore Arb. 3491 (1885) (tribunal manipulated by the executive in host nation). 
FN78 See e.g., Neer Case (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 60 (1926) (term ex-
tended to lack of adequate police protection of aliens). The quoted phrase is derived from the 
separate concurrence of Commissioner Fred K. Nielsen. Id. at 65; see infra text accompanying 
note 81. Commissioner Nielsen's definition is more frequently quoted than that of the majority in 
Neer, perhaps because his definition is more lenient. For the majority's definition, see infra text 
accompanying note 80. 
In Roberts Case (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 77, 80 (1926), after being ar-
rested with a number of others for an assault on a house, Roberts was confined without charge 
for at least seven months in a 35' X 20' jail cell occupied by 30 to 40 other prisoners. Id. at 77-80. 
The cell did not have sanitary accommodations, and the prisoners were ill fed and deprived of 
exercise. The Commissioner found that both Mexico's unreasonably long detention of Roberts 
prior to trial without charge and its subjection of Roberts to cruel and unusual punishment while 
in prison fell well below the minimum international standards. The court stated, "We do not hesi-
tate to say that the treatment of Roberts was such as to warrant an indemnity on the ground of 
cruel and inhumane imprisonment." Id. at 80. 
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In the Kennedy Case, Kennedy, a U.S. Citizen and the assistant manager of a mining 
company located in Mexico, sued the Mexican government for failure to adequately punish a 
mine employee known to have assaulted Kennedy in a labor confrontation. Kennedy Case (U.S. 
v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 194, 195-96 (1927). The General Claims Commission held that 
the two month prison sentence imposed upon Kennedy's aggressor was so out of keeping with 
the seriousness of the crime, which left Kennedy permanently crippled, that it constituted a de-
nial of justice under the minimum international standards of treatment. Id. at 196-99. The same 
determination was made regarding the United States behavior in the De Galvan Case where the 
U.S. was held liable for the failure of Texan courts to prosecute the murderer of a Mexican sub-
ject. The murderer was indicted by a grand jury but not brought to trial for more than six years. 
De Galvan Case (Mex. v. U.S.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 273 (1927). 
FN79 For instance, the British-Mexican Claims Commission stated that responsibility 
for the denials of justice or the undue delay of justice should not be limited simply to judicial au-
thorities. Interoceanic Ry. of Mexico Case, (Gr. Brit. v. Mex.), 5 R. Int'l. Arb. Awards 178, 185 
(1931). Rather, while recognizing that such international delinquencies will usually be an act or 
an omission of a tribunal, the Commission found that often it will be the work of nonjudicial of-
ficers responsible for bringing an alien before the court or enforcing a judgment. For instance, 
the Commission stated: 
[I]f the authorities in whose power he [an alien arrested by the police on a false 
charge] happens to be prevent him from being led before a court, if they bar him access to a tri-
bunal, this must certainly be characterized as a denial of justice or as an undue delay of justice, 
the responsibility for which does not rest with the courts or with any judicial authority, but with 
the non-judicial officials, who deprived the alien of his liberty. Id. 
FN80 Neer Case, 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 61-62. In the Neer Case, the widow and 
daughter of a murdered mine superintendent sued the Mexican authorities for "an unwarrantable 
lack of diligence or an unwarrantable lack of intelligent investigation in prosecuting the culprits." 
Id. at 61. The Commission held that Mexico was not liable for the $ 100,000 claimed, although it 
stated that "better methods might have been used." Id. at 62. 
FN81 Id. at 65. 
FN82 See, e.g., Mallen Case (Mex. v. U.S.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 173 (1927); 
Faulkner Case (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 67 (1926). 
FN83 Faulkner Case, 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 67. 
FN84 Mallen Case, 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 178. 
FN85 Colunje Case (Pan. v. U.S.), 6 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 342 (1933) (United States 
liable for detective's illegal arrest of Panamanian citizen); Baldwin and Others Case (U.S. v. 
Pan.), 6 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 328 (1933) (Panama liable for allowing civilians to attack Ameri-
can soldiers); Quintanilla Case (Mex. v. U.S.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 101 (1926) (United States 
liable for death of Mexican citizen who after escaping from American custody was found dead). 
In the De Sabla Case (U.S. v. Pan.), 6 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 358 (1933), a U.S. citizen success-
fully brought suit for damages against Panama alleging that that government's land laws so un-
reasonably burdened private landowners as to fall below international minimum standards. 
Panamanian officials interpreted domestic laws as requiring them, upon application of a national, 
to relinquish the title of or the right to cultivate land already occupied by aliens, should the 
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owner not personally protest each application. Id. at 360. As a result, the plaintiff, De Sabla, had 
lost title and cultivation rights to much of her land since she was unable to personally oppose 
each individual application to acquire or farm her land. Id at 359-60. Owing to the burdensome 
nature of this practice, which afforded no real protection of aliens' titles, as well as Panama's 
knowledge of De Sabla's land ownership, the Commission held that Panama's actions regarding 
De Sabla's property were "wrongful acts for which the government of Panama is responsible in-
ternationally." Id. at 366. 
FN86 For instance, international law does not require a state to permit all aliens to en-
ter its territory or to afford permanent residence to those that it does. Likewise, a state has no ob-
ligation to afford aliens the right to vote, hold political office or public employment. Nor does 
international law require a state to allow aliens to acquire or inherit certain property or allow ac-
cess to public facilities or resources. Also, aliens may be subject to certain burdens to which na-
tionals are exempt, such as registration or identification procedures. The common denominator 
of these "allowed discriminations" seem to be their political nature. An alien is entitled to the 
protection afforded by the sovereign, but not participation in determining who the sovereign is, 
whether that sovereign be the people of the nation, in which case aliens may be barred from the 
country, or their elected leader, in which case aliens may be denied suffrage. Even discrimination 
under laws and practices governing the acquisition of property may be related to political rights 
since real property ownership has been historically related to the ability to exercise political 
rights. 
FN87 In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 429 (1964), the United 
States Supreme Court did refer to the nondiscriminatory standard of nationalization of property, 
but said it did not clearly apply to communist nations. A major reason for reversal was the notion 
of judicial deference. Id. at 431-33. 
FN88 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 865-66 (2d Cir. 1962), 
rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
FN89 Id. at 867. 
FN90 Id. at 866. Under similar circumstances, the Netherlands protested Indonesia's 
nationalization of Dutch-owned enterprises. Because the official Indonesian acts were aimed at 
Dutch-owned companies exclusively, and did not attempt the expropriation of enterprises owned 
by nationals or citizens of other foreign governments, the Netherlands asserted their nullity under 
international law. See Netherlands-Indonesia, 54 Am. J. Int'l L. 484 (1960). 
FN91 See, e.g., Smith v. Compania Urbanizadora Del Parque y Playa De Marianao 
(U.S. v. Cuba), 24 Am. J. Int'l L. 384, 386-387 (1929) (Cuba held liable for damages for failure 
to accord American citizen the same protection of private property as is given Cuban nationals); 
Cadenhead Case (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), 8 Am. J. Int'l L. 663 (1914) (claim for damages for acciden-
tal death of British subject by American soldier denied because no showing subject had been dis-
criminated against in treatment under American law). 
FN92 Indeed, in many countries the nondiscrimination principle will contain higher 
standards of treatment than the classic minimum international standard; aliens in those countries 
will then typically invoke the nondiscrimination standard, which may have the effect of ratchet-
ing up the content of the international minimum standard. Cf. Smith v. Compania Urbanizadora 
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del Parque y Playa de Marianao (U.S. v. Cuba), 24 Am. J. Int'l L. 384 (1929) (American citizen 
sought equal treatment with nationals under Cuba's constitution). 
FN93 The international law of human rights, however, is evolving to close the gap 
between alien and citizen in this respect. At least as to certain rights—such as habeas corpus and 
freedom from torture—the difference has narrowed to the point of disappearance. 
FN94 E. Vattel, The Law of Nations 251-252 (L. White ed. 1792). 
FN95 See A. D'Amato, International Law: Process and Prospect 89-90, 194-99 
(1987); see also Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals 
Rather Than States, 32 Amer. U.L. Rev. 1 (1982) (discussing the growing importance of human 
rights in international law). 
FN96 See supra note 74. 
FN97 See Restatement, supra note 73, § 711.  
FN98 Borchard, The Law of Responsibility of States for Damages Done in Their Ter-
ritory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, 23 Am. J. Int'l L. 140, 149 (Supp. 1929). 
FN99 Moreover, even on its own terms, the distinction is not persuasive. Discrimina-
tory treatment reveals itself as a problem for religious, racial, and ethnic minorities within na-
tions just as much as a problem for aliens; mere possession of a vote has not always guaranteed 
nondiscriminatory treatment to "discrete and insular minorities" (to use the phrase from the 
United States Supreme Court, U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938)). 
FN100 See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (War crimes committed outside Gen-
eral Yamashita's nation were attributable to him because he was the commander of the forces 
that committed the crimes.); D'Amato, Superior Orders vs. Command Responsibility, 80 Am. J. 
Int'l L. 604 (1986). 
FN101 See, e.g., A. D'Amato, supra note 95, at 94-96 (1987). 
FN102 To be sure, some people would make such a claim and thus deny reality to in-
ternational law. See, e.g., Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 
UCLA L. Rev. 665 (1986). Those who would believe that claim would not only reject everything 
in the present paper; they would reject any claim under the doctrine of state responsibility. 
FN103 See Handl, supra note 3; Quentin-Baxter's Third Report, supra note 3. 
FN104 Handl, supra note 3, at 3-4. 
FN105 Id. at 4. 
FN106 Id. at 6-12. Among the different abnormally dangerous activities conducted by 
a state near an international boundary, Handl discusses nuclear power generation. Objections 
raised to the chosen location of nuclear power plants by neighboring states are repeatedly the 
subject of diplomatic concern, and, in one instance, were the source of a state's decision not to 
site a power plant in a frontier area. In that case, a Swiss plan to site a plant near Ruthi in the 
Upper Rhine Valley close to the Austrian border was strongly criticized by citizens in the 
neighboring Austrian state of Voralberg. After diplomatic talks, Austria announced that it was 
prepared to assert a formal legal claim against the Swiss government if it determined the siting 
violated international law. Not long after this message, the Swiss government declared that it had 
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shelved the construction plan temporarily, a statement Handl interprets to indicate a probable de-
termination by the Swiss government that the plant did in fact violate international law, though 
this was not explicitly conceded by the Swiss government. Id. at 28-30. 
FN107 Id. at 47. Handl writes: 
Assuming that no special authorizing circumstances prevail, conduct of an activity in frontier 
areas is incompatible with established principles of international law if: (a) the activity concerned involves 
a major risk of transnational harm; (b) this risk is a function, at least to a significant degree, of the location 
in which the activity takes place; and (c) the activity in that frontier location amounts to an inefficient use 
between the risk-creating and risk-exposed states of the internationally shared natural resources concerned. 
. . . Id. at 47 (footnotes omitted). 
FN108 Moreover, the insistence throughout his writings that the general tort concept 
of nuisance regulates state liability for extraterritorial activities seems unduly restrictive. 
FN109 The reports are as follows: Quentin-Baxter's Fifth Report, supra note 3; Inter-
national Liability for Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law: 
Fourth Report by Mr. Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/373 
(1983) reprinted in [1983] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 201, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1983/Add. 1 
(Part 1); Quentin-Baxter's Third Report, supra note 3; International Liability for Consequences 
Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law: Second Report of Mr. Robert Q. Quen-
tin-Baxter, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/346/ and Add. 1 & 2 (1981), reprinted in 
[1981] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 103, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1981/Add. 1 (Part 1); Interna-
tional Liability for Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law: Pre-
liminary Report by Mr. Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/334 
and 247, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980 [hereinafter Quentin-Baxter's Preliminary Report]. For 
an overview of the Commission's work, see Magraw, Transbounding Harm: The International 
Law Commission's Study of "International Liability," 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 305, 306-16 (1986). 
FN110 Quentin-Baxter's Third Report, supra note 3, at 62 
FN111 Id. at 62-64. 
FN112 See Handl, supra note 3, at 4. 
FN113 See Quentin-Baxter's Third Report, supra note 3, at 62-64. The schematic out-
line finds the proper balance to allow as "much freedom of choice . . . as is compatible with ade-
quate protection for the interests of affected states." Id. at 63. "Adequate protection" is in turn 
defined as "measures of prevention that as far as possible avoid the risk of injury . . . but [that] 
should be determined with due regard to the importance of the activity and its economic viabil-
ity." Id. 
FN114 See id. at 60; Summary Records of the 1631st Meeting [1980] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. 
Comm'n 246, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980 (observations of Mr. Sucharitkul); Magraw, supra 
note 109, at 322-26; Magraw, supra note 3, at 1046. 
FN115 See Quentin-Baxter's Third Report, supra note 3; Quentin-Baxter's Prelimi-
nary Report, supra note 109; Observations at the Thirty-second Session of the Commission by 
Mr. Sucharitkul, [1980] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 246 1980; Magraw, supra note 109, at 323-26; 
Magraw, supra note 3, at 1046. By "physical linkage" it seems Quentin-Baxter originally in-
tended "via a natural medium" such as the air, water or earth and not through an economic, po-
litical, or cultural medium. Id. at 1046. 
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FN116 See Magraw, supra note 109, at 325. 
FN117 Id. at 326 ("A finding of liability might lead the United States and other states 
that export capital and technology to change their attitudes toward the regulation of foreign in-
vestment and technology transfer. The upshot could be tighter control over, and a corresponding 
decline in, those activities, which, ironically, could hamper the efforts of developing states to 
modernize and decrease their dependency on imports.") 
FN118 See, e.g., A. D'Amato, supra note 95, at 94-96 (nations have equal entitle-
ments). 
FN119 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 153 (1961). 
FN120 Cf. D'Amato, Lon Fuller and Substantive Natural Law, 26 Am. J. Juris. 202, 
204 (1981) (discussing "substantive natural law" which holds that there are certain absolutes in 
law). 
FN121 See, e.g., Bassiouni, Regulation of Armed Conflicts in 1 International Crimi-
nal Law FN 199 (M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1986) (describing the development of the concept of war 
crimes in international law). 
FN122 See, e.g., A. D'Amato, supra note 95, at 123-31 (discussing human rights 
norms that are part of customary international law). 
FN123 See W. F. Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory (1980). 
FN124 It is interesting in this regard to note that Rousseau's greatest scholarly an-
tagonist in The Social Contract was Grotius, whom Rousseau must have correctly regarded as 
being opposed to a social-contract notion of the state due to the inhospitability of that notion to 
universal justice. See Friedmann, Hugo Grotius in 3 Encyclopedia of Philosophy 394. 
 FN125 It is Vattel, especially, who can mistakenly be charged with having a theory 
of sovereignty that appears to be insensitive to transnational justice. See, e.g., Kahn, From Nur-
emberg to the Hague: The United States Position in Nicaragua v. United States and the Devel-
opment of International Law, 12 Yale J. Int'l L. 1, 35-36 (1987) (assuming that Vattel's vigorous 
notion of domestic jurisdiction means that he lacks a concept of denial of justice having transna-
tional implications). 
FN126 A. H. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, ch. XX, sec. xl (F. Kelsey 
trans. 1925) (1646). 
FN127 S. Pufendorf, Elementorum Jurisprudentiae Universalis Libri Duo, obs. V, 
secs. 21-22, 292-93 (Carnegie trans. 1931) (1672). 
FN128 S. Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo, ch. VI, sec. 14, 1307 
(Carnegie trans. 1934) (1688). 
FN129 Suarez, De Triplici Virtute Theologica, Fide, Spe, et Charitate "De Charitate, 
Disputation XIII: De Bello," in Selections from Three Works, 817 (Carnegie trans. 1944) (1621). 
Nevertheless, Catholic writers at that time were less likely to agree to military intervention in 
general, because, as L. C. Green has observed, they were more concerned with the propagation 
of the faith and tended to look for papal authorization for military intervention abroad. See 
Green, Institutional Protection of Human Rights, 16 Israel Y.B. Hum. Rts. 69, 71 (1986). Despite 
the unreality of attempting to divorce religious-ideological motivations from moral ones, it is 
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nevertheless possible to theorize that papal authorization, in the eyes of these writers, was a sur-
rogate for an objective determination that the cause of international justice would be served by 
intervention. 
FN130 E. Vattel, The Law of Nations, or Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to 
the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, Intro., § 11, at lx-lxi (Chitty trans. 1876). 
FN131 Id. at Book II, ch. I, §§ 1-3, at 133-35. 
FN132 Id. at Book II, ch. IV, § 56, at 155. 
FN133 See A. D'Amato, supra note 95, at 215-22. 
FN134 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971). 
FN135 Id. at 378. 
FN136 See A. D'Amato, Jurisprudence: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis of 
Law 267-68 (1984) (discussing Rawls' concept of justice as it might be applied internationally). 
FN137 J. Rawls, supra note 134, at 132. 
FN138 C. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (1979). 
FN139 Id. at 131. "Like Hume, Rawls regards society as a 'cooperative venture for 
mutual advantage.'" Id. at 130 (noting the comparison with D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Na-
ture III, II, ii (1739-40)). 
FN140 Id. at 131. 
FN141 J. Rawls, supra note 134, at 302. 
FN142 For an excellent historical analysis, see Posner, The Concept of Corrective 
Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. Leg. Stud. 187 (1981). 
FN143 Judge Posner's statement is beautifully concise: 
Law is a means of bringing about an efficient (in the sense of wealth-maximizing) allocation 
of resources by correcting externalities and other distortions in the market's allocation of resources. The 
idea of rectification in the Aristotelian sense is implicit in this theory. If a fails to take precautions that 
would cost less than their expected benefits in accident avoidance, thus causing an accident in which B is 
injured, and nothing is done to rectify this wrong, the concept of justice as efficiency will be violated. Id. at 
201 
FN144 See id. 
FN145 See Peterson, A Chernobyl Possible in U.S., Experts Agree, Wash. Post, June 
1, 1986, at A17, col. 1. We are of course not arguing specifically here that a graphite system is 
inherently too dangerous for export, nor that it may be made acceptable by adding safety features 
such as concrete shielding. 
FN146 That the accident is a Type I accident is not, however, completely irrelevant 
when analyzing liability under the international minimum standard. Nation E's internal safety 
standards might be cited, along with the internal safety standards of all the other nations in the 
international community, in an attempt to give content to the international minimum standard. 
Under such an approach, one would consider the international minimum standard to be a "gen-
eral principle of international law" ascertainable, in large part, by a compilation of the internal 
practice of all the states. This methodology of proving international norms would dictate that na-
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tion E's internal standards are at least as relevant as the standards of all the other nations. See 
Onuf, Global Law-Making and Legal Thought, in Lawmaking in the Global Community 1, 24-27 
(N. Onuf, ed. 1982); see also G. Tunkin, Theory of International Law, 190-224 (W. E. Butler 
trans. 1974) (Soviet view). 
FN147 On the other hand, in the event that pollution from the meltdown were to cross 
international boundaries and result in harm to a third nation T, either E or R or both, might be 
liable to T on the theory of an "international minimum standard." See Handl, supra note 3, at 39-
47. 
FN148 The nondiscrimination standard is not theoretically applicable to Types II and 
III. Type II addresses safety factors relevant only to exported plants. Hence, there is no basis for 
comparison between citizens and foreigners and thus no standard for discrimination. Type III 
(negligent manufacture) presumably has the same negligence standard regardless of whether the 
plant is exported or installed domestically. However, difficult questions of choice-of-law can 
arise with respect to the negligence standard. The nondiscrimination standard would possibly be 
a factor in deciding the choice-of-law question (i.e., if the choice of a particular legal system it-
self works a discrimination against persons injured in R). 
FN149 See generally Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780, 786-89 (1972) (ar-
ticulating the standard for informed consent); Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Ther-
apy, 64 Nw. U.L. Rev. 628 (1970) (analyzing cases and commentary on the doctrine of informed 
consent); Comment, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 Calif. L. Rev. 1396, 1407-10 
(1967) (proposing a new standard for informed consent). 
FN150 The decision to import nuclear power technology is frequently that of a cen-
tral committee or ruling elite within a developing country. See Katz & Marwah, supra note 1, at 
145-47 (decision to import nuclear power technology in Egypt made by President Sadat in con-
sultation with the Higher Council for Nuclear Energy without the benefit of any public debate); 
id. at 208 (Iranian nuclear power program initiated by the Shah and closed circle of domestic and 
foreign business associates and political advisors). 
FN151 The real purpose of the importation, indeed, may not have even been to bene-
fit the people, but rather to provide an opportunity for graft, corruption, and kickbacks to the 
leaders of R to induce them to agree to the importation. See id. at 204 (kickbacks to royal family 
in Iran estimated at 20 per cent of total nuclear power reactor purchase or several hundred mil-
lion dollars per reactor); id. at 230 (allegations of Korean-influenced buying slowed export of 
Westinghouse reactor to South Korea); id. at 281 (news reports that Westinghouse made payoffs 
to a close friend of the Marcos family to obtain the Philippines contract). 
FN152 See, e.g., Faulkner Case (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 67 (1926); 
Neer Case (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 60 (1926). 
FN153 Cf. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), Interim Decision (1938) & Final Deci-
sion (1941), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905, 1938; Handl, supra note 3 (presenting ways in which 
risk-creating and risk-exposed states may adjust conflicting claims in order to use shared re-
sources efficiently); Rubin, Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration, 50 Or. L. Rev. 
259 (1971) (recognizing that nations creating extraterritorial hazards must be made aware of 
those hazards before they will be willing to take greater precautions). 
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FN154 Atomic Energy Damages Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982)). 
FN155 See Buffington, The Price-Anderson Act: Underwriting the Ultimate Tort, 87 
Dick. L. Rev. 679, 680 (1983). 
FN156 A nuclear power plant manufacturer might attempt to reduce its potential li-
ability by forming a subsidiary corporation for the sole purpose of designing, manufacturing, and 
exporting a single nuclear power plant. The company's assets, then, would be limited to the prof-
its on that one sale. Obviously, soon after the sale, the company would go into liquidation and 
distribute its assets to its shareholders. But even if those assets could be traced, the total assets 
(consisting only of the profits on one sale) would be woefully insufficient in the event of any 
catastrophic accident. And even so, the parent company has not totally insulated itself against the 
possibility that a foreign court might pierce the corporate subsidiary "umbrella" and reach the 
parent company because a tort is involved. 
FN157 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Publ. L. No. 83-703, §§ 53, 62, 64, 103-104, 68 
Stat. 919, 930, 932-933, 936-937 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2073, 2092, 2094, 2133-
2134 (1982)). 
FN158 Letter from Jane R. Mapes, Senior Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to the Author (July 17, 1987) [hereinafter Mapes Letter] 
(regarding liability for waivers for nuclear exports) (copy on file at the Virginia Law Review). 
FN159 Id.; see Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, entered into 
force March 5, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161. The treaty states that 
"[p]arties to the Treaty . . . shall also cooperate in . . . [furthering] development of the applica-
tions of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, . . . with due consideration for the needs of the de-
veloping areas of the world." Id. at 490-91, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 173. 
According to Ms. Mapes, the warranty disclaimer is also considered unnecessary be-
cause matters relating to waivers of liability for nuclear exports can be covered in contracts be-
tween the receiving country and U.S. suppliers such as General Electric, Westinghouse, and the 
Department of Energy. Mapes Letter, supra note 158. 
FN160 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195 comment b (1977); cf. Williams v. 
Walker Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding that a court may refuse to 
enforce a contract if it finds it unconscionable). 
FN161 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 
1969, Art. 53, 8 I.L.M. 679, 698: 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general 
international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international 
law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from 
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general interna-
tional law having the same character. 
FN162 For a somewhat conservative approach to the concept of "general principles of 
law," see D'Amato, What 'Counts' as Law? in Lawmaking in the Global Community 83, 102-03 
(N. Onuf ed. 1982). 
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FN163 This is not to say that foreigners within the importing nation's territory may 
not be harmed, or that pollution may not carry through the atmosphere and through the water to 
people in other countries. 
FN164 See Scherr, supra note 26, at 276. 
FN165 Even among "realpolitik" advisers in the Reagan Administration, the view to-
day is toward a modified Wilsonianism that considers more seriously the internal relation of for-
eign peoples to their governments. See A. D'Amato, supra note 95, at 227-30. 
FN166 See id. at 194-99 (discussing the strategy of the Calvo clause and the Calvo 
doctrine). 
FN167 See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 187-90 (3d ed. 1986). This conclu-
sion follows from the fact that a reasonable person would prefer to avoid a serious physical in-
jury than to receive monetary damages as compensation. Hence, the purpose of tort law is to de-
ter the injury itself. Of course, a system of forced payment in monetary damages by the injurer 
constitutes the main component of the deterrence factor. 
FN168 See supra text accompanying note 149. 
FN169 Indeed, damages in tort are inherently insufficient to deter accidents, because 
they are premised upon a reasonable standard of care and reasonable safety measures, whereas 
accidents occur in the normal statistical course of deviation from these means. See R. Posner, 
supra note 167, at 187 (describing how a negligence-based tort system deters inefficient acci-
dents). 
FN170 Scherr, supra note 26, at 280-81; see supra text accompanying notes 32-38. 
FN171 For the importance of such systems to the safety of a nuclear power plant, see 
Pollard Letter supra note 29, at 6. 
FN172 See Rosen, supra note 12, at 16. 
FN173 Id.
 
